Proposal “the-dash-dao-irrevocable-trust-2023“ (Completed)Back
Title: | Dash DAO Trust funding 2023/2024 |
Owner: | TheDashDAOTrust |
Monthly amount: | 250 DASH (9015 USD) |
Completed payments: | 2 totaling in 500 DASH (0 month remaining) |
Payment start/end: | 2023-02-09 / 2023-04-10 (added on 2023-02-04) |
Final voting deadline: | in passed |
Votes: | 56 Yes / 27 No / 0 Abstain |
Proposal description
Dash Proposal Funding Request
At the current Dash price of $50 we are asking for funding of $25,000 equating to 500 Dash over the next two budget cycles in order to fund the Dash DAO Irrevocable Trust’s liabilities for the next 12-24 months.
The amount requested includes a buffer to help absorb volatility in the price of Dash and a 1 Dash proposal fee reimbursement fee for the Trust Protector who submitted this proposal.
What does this specific proposal fund?
This proposal is to pay for an invoice issued to the Dash Trust for the continuation of Trustee services for 2023/24 period.
What is the Dash DAO Irrevocable Trust?
Please see Dash Core Group CEO, Ryan Taylor’s forum post - Dash Core Group Legal Structure Details: https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/dash-core-group-legal-structure-details.39848/#post-193885
Who is the Dash Trust Trustee?
The Dash Trust is currently administered by Waheed Hussain of HELMS Family Office, S.A. in Geneva, Switzerland. He is a professional trustee who will carry out any legal instructions assigned by the trust protectors.
Who are the Dash Trust Protectors?
The current elected trust protectors are Patrick Quinn, Troy Douglas Rhodes, Michael Lewis, Jared Lyman, Zane Robert Cook and Foulagi Johnson.
The trust protectors were all elected by the Dash Masternode network during the annual elections in March 2022.
Trust protectors are elected annually, and the next election is due to take place during March 2023.
At the current Dash price of $50 we are asking for funding of $25,000 equating to 500 Dash over the next two budget cycles in order to fund the Dash DAO Irrevocable Trust’s liabilities for the next 12-24 months.
The amount requested includes a buffer to help absorb volatility in the price of Dash and a 1 Dash proposal fee reimbursement fee for the Trust Protector who submitted this proposal.
What does this specific proposal fund?
This proposal is to pay for an invoice issued to the Dash Trust for the continuation of Trustee services for 2023/24 period.
What is the Dash DAO Irrevocable Trust?
Please see Dash Core Group CEO, Ryan Taylor’s forum post - Dash Core Group Legal Structure Details: https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/dash-core-group-legal-structure-details.39848/#post-193885
Who is the Dash Trust Trustee?
The Dash Trust is currently administered by Waheed Hussain of HELMS Family Office, S.A. in Geneva, Switzerland. He is a professional trustee who will carry out any legal instructions assigned by the trust protectors.
Who are the Dash Trust Protectors?
The current elected trust protectors are Patrick Quinn, Troy Douglas Rhodes, Michael Lewis, Jared Lyman, Zane Robert Cook and Foulagi Johnson.
The trust protectors were all elected by the Dash Masternode network during the annual elections in March 2022.
Trust protectors are elected annually, and the next election is due to take place during March 2023.
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Discussion: Should we fund this proposal?
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If you have questions, concerns, ideas, marketing ideas etc, feel free to chime in. Also, that is now super easy since the TPs have their own website:
https://www.dashtrust.org/
We are collecting and writing content for the site, and if you have requests or ideas for more and better resources for the Dash universe, we would appreciate that as well.
And get out there and vote if you have a Masternode, or voting keys for a masternode. This is a critically important Treasury cycle.
Welcome to the new era of more and better communication between DCG/TP/MNO/Forums/etc
thanks!
solarguy
https://www.dashtrust.org/escalation-protocol
And we will certainly be adding more resources and articles and Dash/Crypto content as time goes on.
Solarguy
Is it that the other DFOs are not valuable? Or that the trust is not valuable?
Why would the Dash Trust want to own or run or control the Incubator or any other independent DFO (Dash Funded Organization)? They do their thing, completely independently from DCG or the Dash Trust, exactly as it should be. They get their funding directly from the Masternodes via the Treasury process. And what right does the Dash Trust have to go say to the Incubator people, "Hey, you belong to us now and you do what we tell you to do." ???? That makes as much sense as the Trust Protectors saying to Socrates, "Hey man, ummmm, we're just going to own your house now, ok? Because it's Dash related." It is a complete non sequitur.
Thus, the two choices that you offer, "Is it that the other DFOs are not valuable? Or that the trust is not valuable?" is a false dichotomy. There is a third choice. Yes, other DFOs are valuable, but they don't belong to DCG or the Dash Trust. AND, the Dash Trust is also valuable for the utility it gives the MN community to have a real voice in DCG. It's not an either/or choice.
solarguy
solarguy
I encourage you to draw a picture, it will help clarify your thinking, you might come to see that if the DIF was perceived as valuable for MNOs they would have asked other DFOs to fall under it, and if it was perceived valuable by DFOs they would have asked the DIF to fall under it. And seeing as we don't see this, it seems fair to assume that the DIF is less valuable than it is being portrayed. It will be a simple decision flow chart, go get your crayons.
Perhaps you think people confuse participation with intelligence. Asking moronic questions on reddit every other day to drum up engagement, doxing yourself to participate in a questionable DAO funded entity that has little or no wins under its belt, and a track record of contributing valueless commentary doesn't afford you vaulted status.
Since this was in fact a post asking "them" why don't you sit this one out. It seems you have a reputational vested interested in this organization that disallows coherent thought and conversation. In other words you have a conflict of interest and resist, implicitly or explicitly, the desire or capacity to get clarity on this issue.
I strongly feel below quoted Dash Trust governance process should be kept in place :
''The masternodes will continue to leverage proposal funding as the primary mechanism to influence DCG. As long as DCG is performing to the satisfaction of the masternodes, no other action is required and the trust protectors are compelled to not interfere with the normal operation of DCG.
However, at any time, the DCG board can be evaluated and / or replaced by the trust protectors via direction from the masternodes. This process can be initiated at any time by the masternodes by submitting a proposal to the network which - if approved - triggers this process. The proposal must pass with a 10% threshold, just like other decision proposals posted to the network in the past. If a decision proposal passes instructing the trust protectors to either evaluate or explicitly replace all or some of the DCG board members specified in the proposal, the trust protectors must initiate that process. The trust protectors are ultimately tasked with representing the best interests of the Dash masternodes.''
If funding this budget proposal keeps above mentioned Dash Trust governance process in place, i have no problem with that.
''The proposal must pass with a 10% threshold, just like other decision proposals posted to the network in the past.''
This is from the Dash Trust itself !!
FYI.
I was asked what would happen if no proposal had the 10% threshold. I responded that the 10% threshold only applies in the code to funding proposals. Our code is very clear that protocol changes do not need the 10% threshold, and instead need an activation threshold between 70-85% of masternodes and miners (depends on version and duration on upgrade).
That you do not want to understand how protocol changes are voted on by miners and masternodes does not change that the system is our current system. If you are against the system then you can propose changing the system by writing code that can be either accepted or not by the masternode network and miners.
DCG also will write code based on the networks wishes if they pass a 10% threshold. This is not because we are legally forced to, but because we are at the service of the network. We have always stated that we would abide by the wishes of the MNOs.
but it does not !!
You stick with your code, i will stick with how the Dash Trust details its governance process (including the 10% treshold) and how decision proposals abided by the 10% in the past.
All this really does is further erode my trust in DCG.
Can someone please elaborate on this a little more? Are there line-items for services rendered on this invoice?
Then, any time the Trust Protectors need to take action with regard to the DCG board (our primary expressed power), we can incur additional billable time, just like with outside legal counsel. That happened this past fall, when we had to re-seat a functioning board after all the departures from DCG. For this reason, the current year's annual invoice was a few bucks more, like about $13k.
Beyond this one expense, the Trust Protectors of course incur other small expenses in order to function, like a domain name, email accounts, the new website, etc. These have actually been paid out-of-pocket by the Trust Protectors over the past 1-2 years, which is another reason we need some fresh funding.
Hopefully that answers your question, but do let me know if I missed anything.
From your response, it seems this is not really about value-add services and more about regulatory rent-seeking services. I am curious how much DCG's budget goes to taxes and other legal non-value-adding services like this? If 100% of the budget went to only value-adding services and infrastructure, how much more could we pay each current employee as independent contractors?
If the only real benefit of DCG being a legal corporation is the ability to pay people in fiat then maybe we can poll the current DCG employees and see how much more they would want if they were only paid in Dash directly. I bet this in aggregate would be much less than DCG currently pays in legal overhead.
Please don't take these questions or comments as attacks against the Trust or DCG. I just think it might be beneficial to explore the option of transitioning current services DCG provides as a U.S. based corporation to another operating structure which does not have so much legal overhead. It may turn out that having no legal overhead does not make up for the disadvantages such as having no banking services. However, unless we take an honest look at our options we will never know.
On a side note, it may just be a matter of time before DCG looses it banking services anyways. The federal government has already started a crack down on U.S. based companies dealing with crypto and it probably won't take long for them to come after DCG. If Dash ever gets on their radar that is.
Re: banking, we've been keeping a close eye on this. We actually have conversations going with alternative banks (smaller, more crypto-friendly), just in case.
To your knowledge, is DCG currently actively working with that planning tool ? Including the mentioned missing / poorly defined elements of DCG work ?
See : https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/i-think-dash-needs-some-changes.53198/page-5#post-233656
That was part of the goal for updating/changing the tool used to track all the 8,000 moving parts to get the Evolution Platform out the door. It also facilitates getting the Dash Roadmap up to date, which _was_ woefully old.
solarguy
I am somewhat against even making these types of proposals. I instead believe we should just have all things that are required for DCG to operate in one bucket. The trust was okayed by the MNO network, at that point since it's needed to operate there's really no decision to make except deciding to fund or disband DCG.
Your scaremongering tactics will not work forever, because you obviously deny any kind of open debate on the topic.
And consider at the very least acknowledging that there is a considerable portion of MNOs (potentially a quarter or even upto a third) who desire to outphase and disband the Trust and/or possibly the DIF & any kind of formal legal incorporation.
DCG should operate as kind of a loose association or just a simple group of developers and coders who are paid by the blockchain.
No reason to waste endless amounts of Dash for taxes, legal fees and bureaucratic stuff doing nothing good ever.
The MNOs who wish to change may not be the majority right now, but in future this could very well change.
All this incorporation and legal framework BS will get us declared by the SEC an UNREGULATED SECURITY sooner or later.
Don´t you freakin get it ??
Ironically, this is actually the exact opposite argument Ryan Taylor used to convince voters to support the creation of the Trust in the first place.
In fact, Taylor referred to the very decision you cite -- funding or disbanding DCG -- as the "nuclear option," and presented the Trust to us as a way for us never to have to take that option.
That you, Sam, don't understand this, and that the Trust in question has effectively put you in charge of DCG despite your lack of understanding, is a truly compelling reason to de-fund them, indeed.
2. The Trust Protectors form a second board that is above the DCG internal board, and we seek to do whatever we can to produce a better Dash product for the world. We serve the interests of the Masternode Community. That puts Sam (as valuable as he is) two layers below being in charge as you suggest.
3. Dash Core Group is a corporation, based in the U.S. It, and all its resources are owned by the Dash Irrevocable Trust. This was invented by Dash (primarily Ryan Taylor) and is of tremendous value and utility as a legal structure. If you don't like the current crop of Trust Protectors, it is your right to do so and there is a mechanism to fix that. It's called elections. Feel free to "throw the bums out" via that appropriate tool.
But, as Sam has correctly stated, in legal terms, the Dash Core Group Corporation cannot exist (legally) without the Dash Irrevocable Trust and its board (the Trust Protectors). If the Irrevocable Trust doesn't pay its bills and doesn't have a functional board (the Trust Protectors), the Trustee has the power to shut down the Dash Core Group corporation, sell the assets and then donate the proceeds to the American Red Cross, as specified in the original incorporation documents. Defunding the Trust and causing this terrible outcome would be mortally stupid. It is the wrong tool for the job.
4. That you, Amanda B. Johnson, do not understand the organizational structure of the DCG board and the Trust Protector board, or the legal consequences of defunding the Irrevocable Trust suggests to me that your criticism of our current circumstance is just not very useful.
But thank you for your participation,
Solarguy
What are the upsides?
If anything legal corporations can make hiring people more difficult.
Can you elaborate on the difficulties as you see them? Perhaps there are ways for a DAO to address this.
The minute you need employees, you need a bank account, proper accounting for taxes, withholdings, etc. (which requires software licenses, and other tools, which requires...a bank account/USD). I could go on and on.
Trust me, Socrates, I'd love to live in a crypto utopia where we all just exchange crypto to live our lives, but as of 2023 this is wholly impractical. Nearly 100% of DCG's internationally distributed staff is paid in fiat. If we just gave everyone Dash, and said "figure it out yourself," the company would collapse immediately.
If someone can't figure out how to convert dash into their local currency of choice then they are not talented enough to warrant payment.
There is also an entire ecosystem of payment services that automate this process, though I imagine those are more trouble than they are worth.
The fact that DCG pays in fiat is a big red flag.
I also don't understand why we are holding up DCG as some sort of success case. It is an absolute structural failure. If Dash didn't centralize the majority of development activities into one entity (DCG) we would have a much more vibrant ecosystem, with more features today and happier dash holders. Instead at times it feels we are being held hostage.
As far as I can tell the only benefit of legality is to be able to enter legal contracts with non-DAO entities. This seems valuable in theory, though I question if there has been any significant actual examples of this in practice. I don't know.
I don't see why you think we have centralized the majority of our development activities in DCG. Can you mention a development group that you would have liked to see contribute that wasn't able to?
We also do pay a size-able amount of our developers in Dash. So it is incorrect to say that we pay only in fiat.
DCG has a good vision and product. I don't want DCG to be defunded. However, DCG also captured the entire imagination of the dash ecosystem. The structure that built around it essentially locked the development path of the project. The number of times I read "wait until evo to do X,Y,Z" is huge. I would have much prefered a more competitive landscape. You and others can make the argument that a) there is competition and b) there isn't competitive interest, but I would argue while these things are paradoxically both true they are also a function and result of the structure that we allowed to form around DCG. DCG in many ways has become synonymous with Dash development.
Going forward, I want to see a more competitive environment. This would look like treating all DAO funded entities as contractors and having them compete on their production and merit.
Going forward I also want to see a hardened Dash Core Group. I believe this would mean de-legalizing it. Making it a harder target to attack or otherwise disrupt.
Such a belief may indeed work for the likes of Linux operating systems, etc., but couldn't it be detrimental to a currency network? Doesn't a blockchain network that aspires to be money need to go beyond the software culture that insists there must always be commitment to and money for a "core group"?
I agree with you--DCG as a corporation within our cutting-edge DAO needs to perform MUCH better. The Trust and the Trust Protectors are an essential part of this (and we also need to do much better, btw). Ergo, the network should fund this proposal for the bare minimum expenses we need to do our volunteer jobs on behalf of the beneficiaries (masternodes).
It never came to your mind, we need talented developers who are actually INVESTED in Dash or willing to INVEST THEMSELVES in Dash, or at the very least, who accept Dash as payment, rather than freakin EMPLOYEES who desperately need FIAT to pay for their shitty lives, because they probably own ZERO crypto.
And with such people you want to lead Dash to success.
Hilarious.
If they want fancy stuff like employee contracts, social security and health benefits or anything of this ZOG government BS, well just don´t offer it. Those are the worst people anyway, because they could care less about Dash´s success, because their financial wellbeing is not dependent upon Dash´s success.
Citation needed please. This seems like a totally baseless claim. We are talking about decentralized digital assets are we not?
The DAO can absolutely structure itself to hire contractors and groups of contractors exclusively. There is precedence for it already within this very dao. It is not illegal, it simply requires different expectations from the parties. I don't have the numbers (i'm not sure if anyone does) but I suspect the majority of financial transactions involving the hiring of development labor via the internet is on a contractor basis in which the payment is the only relevant aspect of the agreement between parties. In other words, no one is attempting to take to court the developer in another country who fucked them over on a development project (the costs and logistics don't allow for it). So de facto, you are left with the DAO treasury system.
I asked AshFrancis this same question but then he started talking like a politician. How in practical terms does the trust deliver accountability ? Actual examples would be helpful.
Here again, we're wasting time talking about theory vs. reality. The major exchanges are all about KYC/AML, and in turn, that's all about the established rules of the road, so to speak. Legal entities, etc. The exchanges that do almost all the volume are centralized, and they want nothing whatsoever to do with non-compliance (most especially the US-based ones). As it is, we struggle mightily to get the stink of "privacy coin" off us. (That was the reason for our most recent de-listing, from Huobi.) If we weren't even a legal entity, our situation would be so much worse. I can't emphasize this enough--it's a non-starter to suggest that Dash can go back to pre-legal-entity existence. If we did, that's an entirely different project. For now, we are what we are, it's unique (hybrid of old and crypto economies), and we should give ourselves the best possible chance for success.
Re: hiring, I'm just not familiar with the world you describe. I've been hiring and managing software teams globally for 24 years now. It's just not realistic to make everyone a contractor, in a bunch of different countries and currencies, least of all paying them all in crypto. And quite apart from how feasible it might be, the reality is that DCG isn't that, and it's a non-starter to wave a magic wand and turn us into that.
You managing teams using the process and technology from 24 years ago is not a flex.
Exchanges KYC their customers. They don't KYC assets. Perhaps you are correct and it would lead to dash delisting but you're response is incoherent.
I actually don't want to go down this rabbit hole because attempting to optimize the dash network to conform to the state's ever-changing directives is a losing strategy. Dash being on all major exchanges is less important than Dash being censorship resistant. It is not a non-starter. Dash will not die if it gets delisted. Centralized exchanges will play less role going forward. Things that are hard to get (like drugs) can still be highly desirable and expensive.
I think there isn't much more to get from you on this subject.
If you think Dash the privacy coin is stink, I think I can understand why you'd be pushing the importance of the trust and not understanding that we're in fact creating tools for the alt economy.
I agree the hybrid model that the trust enables is interesting but I am not seeing practical reasons to be excited about it. Dash conforming to the laws paradoxically makes it more fragile and puts the project at greater risk.
Dash needs to lean back into the stink.
The trust was indeed set up as a mechanism to give power to elected trust protectors to remove the board of DCG at the will of the network.
I don't understand how you can say that is the opposite of :
The trust being dissolved would force DCG to be dissolved.
Can you explain how the statements are "exact opposites"?
As I said there is no possible situation where the legal fees for the trust don't get paid and DCG continues to exist.
What exactly are you advocating for?
Failing to fund the trust will mean it will have to shut down, doing so would leave DCG ownerless and also likely to shut down, leaving our devs unemployed and there are many of those devs that are only interested in working under DCGs corporate structure (as opposed to incubator bounties or otherwise). This outcome is pretty catastrophic.
If you vote No as a protest vote agains the Trust structure, the TPs, or DCG. Please consider those ramifications and consider commenting what you want changed either within the Trust, Trust Protectors or DCG so that you concerns can be addressed where possible.
I am obviously voting yes, the accountability that the trust adds between DCG and the network is very important for our long term health. From my perspective, losing DCG is not an option at this pivotal moment in Dash's development.
Can you please elaborate on how in practical terms the trust delivers accountability? Actual examples would be helpful.
This is the usual political BS, spreading FUD.
"The Trust Protectors are on the verge of publishing their protocol..." There is no "verge" that couldn't of happened last month or the month before and so on. I mean really, you are stooping this low to make promises just to get last minute votes?
I stick to my original Yes vote because I want the opportunity to vote No on the current batch of TPs and if there are no viable alternatives, then fine, let it implode.
In any event, moving proposals to Platform will eat up valuable resources, right? I mean, this is the standard argument so far for even for the mildest of changes. The proposal system apparently works just fine, how could DCG find the time later and not now?
Do you imagine that when Platform is "finished" that there will be no critical bugs or important upgrades, maintenance or tweaks? No docs, tutorials, developer engagement, marketing, bizdev? We will be lead to believe DCG will somehow magically find the time and resources to make changes to something that already works.
Can't wait to hear the magical excuses for how things can be done later when they couldn't now.
There is no part of your statement that is true. The DAO is not disintegrating. Why would you even think that?
If you would be kind enough to supply actual evidence for anything you just said, I would be happy to respond to that.
Solarguy, Masternode Owner, Trust Protector and a proud member of the longest running DAO in the world.
- While Sam was rejecting calls for a delay to find alternative solutions.
- While Sam was trashing Rion's alternative proposal.
- While Sam was trashing his own proposal for an all nodes solution.
- While Sam was ignoring the solution to reduce collateral proportionally even though he stated it as workable.
- While Sam was refusing ALL COMPROMISES.
- While Sam was demanding that the final solution must run on no more than 100 nodes.
- While Sam was snaking his Trojan Horse Proof of Stake shitcoin into dash.
- While claiming there would be no loss of funds but ignoring the impact of the dash treasury moving to Platform.
- While you was busy praising DCG for their dedication.
- While Sam was claiming his proposals was a "poll" and then instantly converting it to consent, already started coding his "solution".
- While blatantly abusing the dash protocol for consensus and saying he can do as he chooses with the results.
- While knowingly making the single most dramatic changes to the dash protocol without meeting the highest standards of consensus.
- While promising to complete work on masternode shares and then breaking his promise with delays after getting his way.
- While Sam was trashing my proposal for fractional voting yet a) not delivering masternode shares, or b) if he does ever deliver masternode shares, that they will by default feature fractional voting... but if not, why not?
Yeah, I think you missed that part.
How do you propose the DAO irrevocable trust continuing without funding? For if it can continue without funding then why are you seeking funding?
And in any event, that I voted Yes to save your ass, not because I believe the Trust Protectors are competent but because without any Trust Protectors the trust is DOA.
I can only hope that next generation of Trust Protectors have more the balls to stand up to DCG. To stop DCG sucking up the vast majority of the treasury. And all the while retaining control of hard forks and sporks.
Just so damn lucky no one has educated the SEC that dash is walking and talking like a security.
But yeah, you're doing your job, right?
It sounded awesome if I say so myself. But there were risk issues and technical problems that could not be resolved. In the end it was dropped before the proposal to poll the MN community regarding the methods that would actually work.
Early on, Sam recognized that HP-Evo-Platform nodes would solve all the technical issues, AND would have substantially less centralization problems than some other solutions that had been considered. Superficially, it does look centralized, but in real life that is not really true.
But he was willing to let others do a high level review to confirm that there were no other solutions that were better. Further, he was willing to put the various solution to a vote by the community (including the "All MN run Platform". Those were both compromises that would delay the solution, but he agreed to them (not rejected as you suggest). Plus, after the high level review, it was the DCG board who voted to proceed with that proposal, not just Sam.
Rion also put forth an independent solution as a completely separate proposal. Remember that Dash is decentralized and permissionless. The whole MN community got to read up on those various options and vote on them. The 4k solution won.
Some days it's fun to get the insider view of the sausage being made. On other days, it's frustrating to find a way forward given the many many constraints that we face. I'm somewhat sorry you missed that insider's view.
To prevent this from turning into a full length novel, I will respond to the "Is Dash a Security" concern and the funding of the Trust Protectors in a separate post.
Solarguy
Much to the contrary ! For the SEC such a Trust will surely be considered a confirmation of being a security.
solarguy
Any kind of incorporation is creating a legal entity subject to law of that jurisdiction, and possibly as well subject to international trade laws governed by WTO.
It makes Dash potentially sueable, not just in civil but also in penal ways.
There are more reasons, why it would be better to move away from any kind of incorporation and legal entities.
Paying no more taxes to this traitorous ZOG regime would be another very good reason.
I am uncomfortable with the apparent coziness between the Trust Protectors and Dash Core Group. The lack of intervention on possibly the most significant changes to the dash protocol since its inception. The network must be alert to the possibility of corruption.
Despite this, I voted in favor of the trust because I am allowing for the possibility of change and I am concerned how much further Dash Core Group will go without some kind of restraint, albeit somewhat superficial.
It is my observation that for an extended period of time, Dash Core Group has been working for itself and not always to the benefit of the network as a whole.
That Dash Core Group not only maintains control of hard forks but also manages protocol transitions via Sporks. That their influence over the network, both in terms of social influence and secret masternode holdings, may amount to the deception of running a Decentralized Autonomous Organization.
I ask, since 2015, the formation of the Dash DAO, or since the legal formation of the Dash DAO Irrevocable Trust, to what extent has Dash Core Group or the Trust Protectors sought to keep the network decentralized and autonomous?
I do not believe it is enough to say its investors and stake holders - miners and masternode owners - always have the option to hire an alternative contractor as the facts expose this to be false. To counter this argument, not only must DCG have proof of de-funding, but demonstrate a comprehensive alternative exists.
Masternode owners claim membership along with voting power via a fixed collateral of 1000 / 4000 dash. And although the collateral is held in self-custody, its members must participate in the upkeep of financial services to receive regular dash rewards. In other words, there is an expectation of financial gain that may be overwhelmingly controlled by Dash Core Group.
Additionally, the required membership collateral has not changed in proportional to the emission of dash. This means the network protocol - as controlled by Dash Core Group - is explicitly giving favor to early investors while outputting lower rewards to newer investors. We may say this is high risk, high reward and therefore giving credence to the expectation of profit on said investment.
Furthermore, the introduction of Dash Platform / Evolution will further partition and gentrify the network by allowing even higher collateral nodes of 4000 dash, exclusivity and privilege to participate in additional paid services. As the collateral has remained constant in relation to dash emission, I assume early investors are raising the bar and squeezing out newer investors.
"In a 2018 interview with CNBC, Jay Clayton, who was then chair of the SEC, made a firm statement about the debate into whether cryptocurrencies fall under the purview of the SEC:
“Cryptocurrencies: These are replacements for sovereign currencies, replace the dollar, the euro, the yen with bitcoin. That type of currency is not a security.”
A cryptocurrency like Bitcoin doesn’t pass the Howey Test. While Bitcoin meets the test’s first prong, it doesn’t satisfy the second and third elements. With Bitcoin, there is no common enterprise where investors are pooling THEIR FUNDS (caps are my emphasis), there’s no promoter or issuer, and an investor’s success isn’t reliant on the efforts of others.
As opposed to being a security, Bitcoin, which has never sought public funds to help develop its technology, is considered an asset in a similar vein as gold or diamonds.
But ICOs are an entirely different matter. In 2018, Clayton made a now-famous statement when he declared during a Senate hearing that “every ICO I’ve seen is a security.”
solarguy
Its just your wishful thinking.
Dash is NOT Bitcoin.
There are several key differences.
Jay Clayton never claimed that legal incorporation never influences the outcome of the Howey Test or whether its deemed a security by the SEC. Otherwise prove me wrong.
Maybe I am interpreting this wrong but it seems to me MNOs are entirely dependent on DCGs success, or not. At least that's what I'm reading from multiple proposal votes.
Prove to the network that dash is not walking and talking like a security.
I hope you understand, this is not me blaming you alone, this is not a personal attack. Most of my frustration is aimed at DCG who have a shitty track record. And yes, some at the Trust Protectors as a group.
I'm not sure parameter tweaks counts as a compromise. Some offered different ideas and some asked for delays to find alternatives. Rejected.
In any event, I agree with you that this has to be a Yes vote, reluctantly.