Proposal “Pay-MNOs-Who-Vote“ (Closed)Back
| Title: | Pay MNOs who vote |
| Owner: | forro68 |
| One-time payment: | 1 DASH (21 USD) |
| Completed payments: | no payments occurred yet (1 month remaining) |
| Payment start/end: | 2024-07-10 / 2024-08-07 (added on 2024-07-02) |
| Final voting deadline: | in na |
| Votes: | 88 Yes / 200 No / 61 Abstain |
Proposal description
Many Masternode Owners don't take part in Dash governance. It takes time and effort to read all the proposals, ask questions, debate merits, and monitor results over time. Those who do should be directly rewarded for it.
At the end of each voting cycle, give all unspent funds to MNOs who voted either yes or no on a proposal, in proportion to how many proposals they have voted on. Abstains would not be included.
For example, at the end of a voting cycle, if there are 10 proposals, each with 500 'yes' or 'no' votes, that's 5000 votes total. If there are 1000 unspent dash at the end of the cycle, that's 0.2 dash per 'yes or no' vote. If an MNO voted 'yes/no' on one proposal, they would receive 0.2 dash. If an MNO voted 'yes/no' on 10 proposals, they would get 2 dash.
Logical Effects:
1. If we pay them to vote on proposals, more MNOs will come to vote. When they come to vote, they will see the proposals, ask questions, and begin to engage more with the community. They will bring fresh perspectives, new ideas, and share dash news with the rest of the world.
2. As all unspent funds would go to the voters, they will begin to require better proposals, more transparency, accountability, and better results. Those proposal owners who cannot provide that will not be funded and those funds would instead go to the voters.
3. The small but important monthly 'bonus' will increase the ROI of having a masternode, making it a more attractive investment, so more people will invest in MNs, locking up more coins, increasing scarcity, and further raising the value of dash for all holders.
4. Over time, as proposals become more effective, the value of dash will rise, and that 2 dash will be worth much more, benefitting the MNOs and all holders.
6. There will likely be an increase in 'no' votes. However, we don't need to fear a wave of 'no' votes killing all proposals every month. MNOs are heavily invested in Dash. Currently a masternode costs ~$24,000. Ten MNs cost ~$240,000. One hundred MNs cost ~$2.400,000. These are not small investments. It is quite safe to assume the very vast majority of MNOs want their holdings to increase in value. Very few would risk voting no on every proposal every month in hopes of gaining a few extra dash as they know it risks destroying the value of their investment. They understand we must fund developers, marketing and other things in order for the value of dash to rise.
Incentivizing them to play a more active role will increase participation and breathe new life into the treasury, benefiting the entire community and all holders. It will become exciting again!
Keep in mind that some, but not all, of those who benefit from the current system, those who are getting easy money every month, will attack this idea with FUD. They don't care about dash, they just want their easy money. We can make this project better, let's do this.
Edit:
There is a lot of unwarranted fear here.
Your time and effort is valuable and you should be rewarded for it.
Positive incentives are more powerful and create a better culture than punishments.
Fellow Dashers, read the entire proposal and take some time to think it through. Nearly all responses are knee-jerk, fear-based responses to change.
Dash has fallen from the top 10 to nearly 200. Evo will not save it. There will likely be a short term pump but the slide into oblivion will continue as I have warned for years.
Whatever unfounded fears and unlikely bad effects you imagine could result from this proposal pales in comparison to the tragic reality of our place in crypto.
We need a bigger crowd participating in the treasury. Let's breathe new life into this project. Pay them and they will come and pay yourself for your time and effort.
PS: Demo, please stop spamming.
At the end of each voting cycle, give all unspent funds to MNOs who voted either yes or no on a proposal, in proportion to how many proposals they have voted on. Abstains would not be included.
For example, at the end of a voting cycle, if there are 10 proposals, each with 500 'yes' or 'no' votes, that's 5000 votes total. If there are 1000 unspent dash at the end of the cycle, that's 0.2 dash per 'yes or no' vote. If an MNO voted 'yes/no' on one proposal, they would receive 0.2 dash. If an MNO voted 'yes/no' on 10 proposals, they would get 2 dash.
Logical Effects:
1. If we pay them to vote on proposals, more MNOs will come to vote. When they come to vote, they will see the proposals, ask questions, and begin to engage more with the community. They will bring fresh perspectives, new ideas, and share dash news with the rest of the world.
2. As all unspent funds would go to the voters, they will begin to require better proposals, more transparency, accountability, and better results. Those proposal owners who cannot provide that will not be funded and those funds would instead go to the voters.
3. The small but important monthly 'bonus' will increase the ROI of having a masternode, making it a more attractive investment, so more people will invest in MNs, locking up more coins, increasing scarcity, and further raising the value of dash for all holders.
4. Over time, as proposals become more effective, the value of dash will rise, and that 2 dash will be worth much more, benefitting the MNOs and all holders.
6. There will likely be an increase in 'no' votes. However, we don't need to fear a wave of 'no' votes killing all proposals every month. MNOs are heavily invested in Dash. Currently a masternode costs ~$24,000. Ten MNs cost ~$240,000. One hundred MNs cost ~$2.400,000. These are not small investments. It is quite safe to assume the very vast majority of MNOs want their holdings to increase in value. Very few would risk voting no on every proposal every month in hopes of gaining a few extra dash as they know it risks destroying the value of their investment. They understand we must fund developers, marketing and other things in order for the value of dash to rise.
Incentivizing them to play a more active role will increase participation and breathe new life into the treasury, benefiting the entire community and all holders. It will become exciting again!
Keep in mind that some, but not all, of those who benefit from the current system, those who are getting easy money every month, will attack this idea with FUD. They don't care about dash, they just want their easy money. We can make this project better, let's do this.
Edit:
There is a lot of unwarranted fear here.
Your time and effort is valuable and you should be rewarded for it.
Positive incentives are more powerful and create a better culture than punishments.
Fellow Dashers, read the entire proposal and take some time to think it through. Nearly all responses are knee-jerk, fear-based responses to change.
Dash has fallen from the top 10 to nearly 200. Evo will not save it. There will likely be a short term pump but the slide into oblivion will continue as I have warned for years.
Whatever unfounded fears and unlikely bad effects you imagine could result from this proposal pales in comparison to the tragic reality of our place in crypto.
We need a bigger crowd participating in the treasury. Let's breathe new life into this project. Pay them and they will come and pay yourself for your time and effort.
PS: Demo, please stop spamming.
Show full description ...
Discussion: Should we fund this proposal?
Submit comment
|
No comments so far?
Be the first to start the discussion! |
You are the spammer, because you ask the masternodes a question without any serious preparation and without any hope that your proposal may be implemented if voted.
So it is a question just for the question, a meaningless question that should be ignored by the voters and tagged with the troll or the amateur tag.
So I am spamming a spammer. An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.
Masternode owners should only be paid for keeping their nodes up 24/7, that's it, nothing else.
I realize most MNOs ego would never allow this but, if they were honest, they would have to admit that almost every single proposal outside of DCG has failed or no longer provides any value to dash. If anyone wants to argue against this then they should at least provide a list of dao funded projects that left any kind of legacy. That list is going to be *very* small!
Does anyone understands what I am talking about?
Could you ask an AI to code that thing in the the Dash code, and allow the payment of the masternodes when voting?
Can AI code such things? I really doubt, but you can try it.
https://mnowatch.org/votethenumbers/votethenumbers3/calc3.php?proposals%5B%5D=Pay-MNOs-Who-Vote
Whoever wants the statusquo of the 10% net votes to be challenged, he/she may put a proposal for it. ( https://www.dash.org/forum/index.php?threads/pre-proposal-put-the-unvoted-10-net-votes-threshold-of-the-dash-budget-system-into-vote.54042 ). I have just 2 dash and I am saving them for the Encointer_UBI proposal, so challenging the 10% net votes election system cost half of my Dash fortune!!! Someone else should challenge it.
https://mnowatch.org/latestlink_DashdUniqueHashVotes.html?3=PAY-MNOS-WHO-VOTE
NO votes
https://mnowatch.org/latestlink_DashdUniqueHashVotes.html?4=PAY-MNOS-WHO-VOTE
#13
For all proposals the Datastring looks like this:
"DataString": "{"end_epoch":1774469172,"name":"wrapped-dash","payment_address":"Xcxhh7nyxLS2s9Ck4NST4zGAdwfacSKL56","payment_amount":10,"start_epoch":1710082172,"type":1,"url":"https://www.dashcentral.org/p/wrapped-dash\"}",
But for the PAY-MNOS-WHO-VOTE proposal it looks like this
"DataString": "{"name":"Pay-MNOs-Who-Vote","payment_address":"XvoyeepHzw3o6wHE73FcNn6xsUBZRSnb5w","payment_amount":1,"type":1,"url":"https://www.dashcentral.org/p/Pay-MNOs-Who-Vote\","start_epoch":1720569600,"end_epoch": 1722988800}"
These DCG developers are unpredictable! I give up!
But allow me to tell a
W##@$%$#%!$#@^#^#&#%^*&^%#*%^*&$%*((*&%*#$^%!!@!##@%$#@
to DCG for changing the code without warning.
https://gitlab.com/dundemo/mnowatch/-/commit/48e6849e73b3b9c1f411c73cbea2a3dba6177135
1) You think, that the low voting participation is a problem, that needs to be solved. IMHO you’re wrong: The DAO just works as intended, bad decisions as seen in the past are less and less frequent. And higher participation won’t necessarily result in better quality. (Sometimes people elect liars and criminals as president.)
2) You think, that the current incentive for voting (better Dash network in the long term) is not sufficient. IMHO you’re wrong: The current incentive is a very high reward in the long term, and requires not only participation in voting, but also well-considered voting.
3) You think, that more MNOs would come to vote. IMHO not necessarily, this is just your guess (see point 2).
4) You think, that the new voters, who will come for the additional reward, will automatically take the time and effort for making well-considered decisions. IMHO you’re wrong: If they don’t take the time now, they won’t do it neither with the additional reward.
5) You think, that the voters would begin to require better proposals. IMHO you’re wrong: They do this already.
6) You think, that the ROI is the important criterion for investing in an MN. IMHO you’re wrong: The important criterion is a rising value of Dash, that would certainly outperform the ROI. And the value will rise, when good decisions are made. Furthermore the unspent funds are burned, so it contributes already to a higher value of Dash (less inflation).
IMHO the DCG has better things to do, than implementing this "voting-reward".
Shall we punish the masternodes who dont vote at all?
You should not form a governance question demanding for something new to happen, because your brand new phantasy may be proved very difficult, very costly or even impossible to be coded. Also suppose your proposal barely passes the required 10% net votes and it is approved. Does this makes it stronger than the status quo? The proponents of the status quo may claim that the status quo is supported by a silent majority of much more than 10%, and you cannot prove them wrong. So If you want a change to occur, initially you should form a governance question ASKING THE MASTERNODES TO CONFIRM THE STATUS QUO.
That way you expose the Dash status quo, which has NEVER been voted. The Dash status quo has been decided by agents having in their mind that their red lines should never been passed.
1) You put a governance question asking the voters to confirm the status quo.
2) If the status quo is not confirmed, obviously a change is needed, so you search someone to fund and/or to code the change.
3) After coding the change, you put into vote your governance proposal along with the required code.
When I say "put a governance question asking the voters to confirm the status quo" I obviously mean that this question should last long (at least 24 months, if not permanent). So that the supporters of the status quo do not have the excuse that they did not have time to vote. They should not be able to claim that the status quo issue did not reach the required minimum participation due to a limited voting period.
So you should fisrt post a proposal describing the voting status quo in details, in hope that the status quo will not pass the 10% net votes proposal method.
And then follow the 2nd and 3rd step.
We should NOT REWARD the masternodes who VOTE.
We should PUNISH the masternodes who do NOT VOTE.
IMHO the SOLUTION to the problem is this:
In case a masternode does not vote for a long time (we could vote the numbers in order to define that time), his/her set of votes (at the long standing proposals) should not count into the final voting outcome until he/she returns, neither his masternode node should count when calculating the 10% net votes election method.
Similar to the POSE_BANNED masternode state, a new masternode state should be introduced, the VOTE_BANNED.
Sure some will say this will just cause masternodes to vote without putting much thought or effort into it, but i feel the benefits (increase voting participation, increase healthy competition) outweigh that risk.
Granting any leftover funding / unallocated funding to those masternodes that participated in the voting will strenghten the Masternodes APY on L1 a little bit. Perhaps not by much, but any increase can help here.