Welcome!

OK, I this proposal is not super clear as to what is being suggested. What was the catalyst that caused this desire for change? Is it believed that funds that were slated to go to development went elsewhere? Or maybe it's just that MNO or the network have no way of approving one part of the budget from another?

II think the main complaint is that we lost our developers and the project slowed down due to the downturn in Dash price. This caused Dash to fall behind and sunk the price down further. Obviously this was frustrating to a lot of people.

If the development side of DCG put in for their own funding, then they would be in charge of how much is needed and received, instead of being part of a tug of war for the self imposed 60% of the treasury. I guess that means both entities, DCG Developers and non-developers will compete for funding separately. In a way, it will give the network more control over where the funds go. As it is, the chiefs decide how much and where the funds will be requested and MNOs can only say yay or nay. But with this split, we could vote yay to one and nay to another if funds are tight or if we aren't on board with something being proposed.

I think it's worth a try, for the future, since I do believe at this time, the issue has been rectified. But it could happen again, and next time in the other direction (not enough funding for business development and marketing). If there is ever a disagreement in DCG they will have no influence upon each other's budget unless they want to, and they can take it to the voters to decide :) I'm voting yes.

This post reeks of irrational behavior. Why are you voting yes for a proposal that you don't understand the rationale for, nor that you don't know where the reasoning for it came from?

I like the idea of allowing MNOs to direct funding to where they feel it needs to be directed when there is a conflict. I still don't understand how this makes DCG more transparent though. Unless, when the situation arises where they are competing for funds and open up with more information to garner votes

How can you expect more accountability and transparency from DCG by this proposal, when DCG themselves are bound to all kinds of non-disclosure agreements with potential new partners ?

With regards to your earlier remark :

''the main complaint being that we lost our developers and the project slowed down due to the downturn in Dash price. This caused Dash to fall behind and sunk the price down further. Obviously this was frustrating to a lot of people.''

We don't actually know why the Dash Trust Protectors created this decision proposal, all we know is that they discussed feedback from certain verified masternode operators who raised concerns and requests for change surrounding DCG department accountability and dissatisfaction with leadership performance (see comment DashTrustProtectors).

That was enough for the Dash Trust Protectors to initiate the creation of this decision proposal, which by the way directly interferes with the operations of DCG.

Let me quote the legal structure of the Dash Trust Protectors once more :

The Trust is not chartered to interfere with the operations of DCG under normal circumstances (e.g., the masternodes are continuing to fund its operations), but it may take action if it is notified of an act of dishonesty or misappropriation of funds, or if a vote by the masternodes compels them to replace the directors of DCG.''

People really need to ask themselves if the Dash Trust Protectors and currently operating according their mandates or are severly overstepping their mandates.

That's what I don't see, how this helps with accountability. The only benefit I can see is in the rare, and now that I think about it, unlikely scenario that another amazing project came along and DCG would have to be defended to pay for it. Then, with two separate proposals, the MNOs could prioritize between dev and "other" (I have no idea what they'd call themselves)

But for accountability, I don't see it, and that's what I was trying to say above, it's not clear how this would help??

I started my previous comment poorly, i should have typed 'How can people expect more accountability' instead of 'How can you expect more accountability'.
Sorry about that.

*defunded

Correction :

People really need to ask themselves if the Dash Trust Protectors are currently operating according their mandates or if they are severly overstepping their mandates.

>I like the idea of allowing MNOs to direct funding to where they feel it needs to be directed when there is a conflict.

How would you or other MNOs know when there is a conflict within DCG? MNOs have never been tasked with this before and we don't have the closeness to the org or expertise to micromanage something like that. MNOs have enough work in evaluating proposals and making sure our nodes are up IMO.

As I see it, DCG should remain a blackbox to the network, just like other DAOs. This would set a bad precedent and create room for overmanagement, which is much more destructive than undermanagement. Undermanagement only has to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Overmanagement, too many cooks in the kitchen as it were, would ruin not only DCG but the MNOs relationship with DAOs in general.

The following is an official statement approved by all the Dash Trust Protectors. The DTPs discussed feedback from verified masternodes operators for a few weeks internally prior to submitting the governance proposal to the masternode network.

The Trust Protectors received direct requests from verified masternodes operators raising concerns and requests for change surrounding DCG department accountability and dissatisfaction with leadership performance.

After a few weeks of daily Trust Protector discussions on how best to move forward and represent the requests of the masternode operators, we had an internal DTP vote before we submitted the governance proposal to the masternode network.

The result of that vote was that 5 out of 6 DTPs voted Yes to proceed with the proposal. One Dash Trust Protector did not cast a vote as they were absent.

Since that vote, DTPs had their monthly meeting and all six DTP attendees were in full agreement with this official statement.

As a Trust Protector, I supported the posting of this proposal. It's my belief that the responsibility of the Trust Protectors is to act as a tool for the network, not to enforce any of their individual views. Part of that responsibility means giving network participants the ability to raise their concerns and subsequently validate those concerns with the rest of the network.

There have been comments (from DCG board members) suggesting that this is outside the scope of the Trust Protectors which I disagree with; the action of forcing changes to the DCG board is drastic and every effort should be made to resolve concerns before any such action is taken. I also made it clear that I would only ever act on an affirmative governance vote (except for the handling of a crisis).

Every elected Trust Protector as per the July elections was given the opportunity to give their comments on the proposal, I didn't provide as much input as I should have as there was uncertainty about my TP status.

I think there are some improvements that we could make, but the core premise of this proposal remains; greater transparency at DCG and the ability to make more granular implicit feedback via votes. It's clear that this premise is desired by many network participants. Being able to quantify feedback on this through votes is valuable for the network and for DCG - this isn't an us vs them, it's an opportunity for the network participants to provide that feedback and for DCG to address it as necessary or voluntarily.

As an individual, I'm a huge proponent of transparency, I have always respected the Buffer model of 'defaulting to transparency'. Likewise, in more recent times; the move by ShapeShift towards becoming a DAO is a great example and we can learn from that (given time to prove itself).

I will support moves towards greater transparency by DCG, as it can be somewhat of a monolithic organization and opaque at times. I also understand the necessity for privacy in certain cases, and even that opening everything up can invite questions and dialogue that are quite frankly a hindrance. It's a nuanced situation and I don't expect it to be resolved overnight, from my perspective it's more about a DCG cultural move towards greater transparency and the network supporting such a move and less about any one change.

All this aside, I do support the individuals of DCG, Ryan has my confidence in generally managing DCG. Whilst having someone more publicly inspiring and a figurehead for Dash would be great, Ryan does the work, he empowers his team and he has earned their confidence. Likewise, I have so much respect and confidence in Quantumexplorer, and him becoming interim CTO is a huge win for Dash and I can only hope he continues in that role permanently. We have also seen DCG working closely with the incubator, respecting the concerns raised there, and adapting to its needs (and leveraging it too). Finally, we have seen more communication from QE during the last few weeks than we did during Bobs' entire term (and this is not an exaggeration!). The more support we see for these changes the better.

I would like to see the board do more AMAs and interviews, I want our devs to share their knowledge and demonstrate their thought leadership in the space through Medium articles, DIPS, etc. I would like to see more of our individual team members sharing their wins and more support for all of this from the network.

I know bandwidth is a concern and there are only so many hours in a day, but all of this doesn't actually take that much time and the confidence it will give the network is far more valuable than the hours it costs. Even smaller projects with limited funding are providing more insight into their work, more demonstrable progress and more communication than us and it makes us look stale and doesn't reflect how innovative we truly are.

I'd also note that it's important to me that there is a distinction between 'Dash Core Group Marketing and Biz Dev' and 'Dash Marketing and Biz Dev' as the largest organization in Dash, they have become the de facto point of contact for all things biz dev and marketing, even to the point of damned if they do, damned if they don't - this was a necessary expansion of their role, that doesn't mean it shouldn't operate semi-independently and autonomously in terms of financing or be subject to different success criteria though. As with the development incubator, there are different solutions for different problems - some developers much prefer a bounty model, some much prefer a salaried role. To that same effect, there are interactions that require the DCG corporate entity and structure that provides and some that don't.

It is my opinion that all of thsee 'official organizations' are creating large attack surfaces for Dash that didn't exist before. This is a problem for the network as they create openings for trollish and shill behavior.

In an ideal world this wouldn't be the case, but the fact is that this must be considered, especially considering all the damage such individuals have caused to the Dash project. People pretending to care about Dash while in fact working together to destroy it must be taken into account.

''There have been comments (from DCG board members) suggesting that this is outside the scope of the Trust Protectors which I disagree with; the action of forcing changes to the DCG board is drastic and every effort should be made to resolve concerns before any such action is taken. I also made it clear that I would only ever act on an affirmative governance vote (except for the handling of a crisis).''

The Dash Trust Protectors have the following ways to introduce change :

Trust protectors were intended to initiate change through the following mechanisms:
- Own the shares of DCG
- As shareholders, reassign the DCG board if the masternodes instruct it to do so
- Assign or hire the trustee of the Trust
- Hold other passive assets that ultimately belong to the network such as patents or trademarks assigned to it by DCG or other legal entities, and enforce any associated licensing requirements

Source : Glenn Austin (CFO of Dash Core Group)

The Dash Trust Protectors have their legal structure described here :

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/dash-core-group-legal-structure-details.39848/#post-193885

''The main relationship between the two legal entities is that The Dash Trust possesses 100% ownership of the shares of DCG and therefore controls DCG’s board of directors. The Trust is not chartered to interfere with the operations of DCG under normal circumstances (e.g., the masternodes are continuing to fund its operations), but it may take action if it is notified of an act of dishonesty or misappropriation of funds, or if a vote by the masternodes compels them to replace the directors of DCG.''

Source : Robert Wiecko (COO of DCG)

Since there is no case of dishonesty, no case of misappropriation of funds, no case of a vote by the masternodes, The Dash Trust Protectors are very clearly and very openly operating outside of their workscope and beyond their legally defined mandates (which are by the way formally described here : https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/dash-core-group-legal-structure-details.39848/#post-197228).

With regards to your statement that 'action of forcing changes to the DCG board is drastic and every effort should be made to resolve concerns before any such action is taken' :

I have seen no effort whatsoever from the Dash Trust Protectors to resolve these concerns before taking the drastic decision to create this polling proposal, instead i just see a lot of backdoor talkings between the Dash Trust Protectors and an unknown group of masternode operators and a very quick agreement to create a polling proposal for this topic, without talking to either Dash Core Group or the Dash community.

The result of this is that i have very little trust currently in our current Dash Trust Protectors.

I think there's a nuance about what the TPs can legally do, and what they can do.

Anyone, even an org, has the ability to make ANY proposal. And DCG has always respected every passing proposal. I think it's hilarious to debate if the TPs can do this, as everyone can do this.

However, I don't think that the TPs can legally enforce the change made in this proposal, except by replacing the board. However as DCG would respect the vote, as stated by Glenn, the point is moot.

The question about whether the TPs should have done this or not is debatable. Currently there are more yes votes then no votes. So I guess the pressure was there and what they did has been justified. However I think a little less loaded language in the proposal would have been better.

I personally am not for what is proposed in this proposal. I think it stems from misunderstandings, and I think that there are better ways to solve the issues than to separate compensation proposals which would lead to a massive can of worms.

For example, why are marketing and biz dev grouped together? Why would one team be defunded if it performs but the other team does not? With such small teams how do promote transparency without revealing individual people's salary?

I don't view the Dash Trust Protectors as just anyone, i view the Dash Trust Protectors as representatives of a legal trust, given certain legal mandates to serve that legal trust and restricted to serving those legal mandates. The Dash Trust Protectors operational budget is to support those legal mandates, not to support and pay for proposal fees of decision proposals that are beyond the Dash Trust Protectors legal mandates.

The Dash Trust Protectors are directly accountable to the masternodes for their actions and their membership can be terminated and replaced by new Dash Trust Protection members, by the masternodes :

''Election to appoint Protectors.Protectors shall be the board of the operating company until such time as the Master Nodes - affirmatively declare a termination and replacement set of protectors or declare a termination of the Trust.''

Source : https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/dash-core-group-legal-structure-details.39848/#post-197228 (article 1.3 of the The DASH DAO Irrevocable Trust)

So no, i don't think the Dash Trust Protectors are just like anyone else and should therefore not be allowed to create decision proposals. If they were like anyone else, and could act like anyone else, then why do we even need the Dash Trust Protectors ?

I think, however, that DCG would be remiss in respecting a vote on a proposal that was created outside of the mandate of the org. DCG is not tasked with just 'laying down at any whim'. DCG's mandate is to steward the network to the best of their ability while heeding the call of their customers, MNOs.

If the DTP is making proposals and recommendations based on illegitimate premises, then DCG following that would be them going AGAINST the network.

Basically what's happening is the network is not being respected because a shady cabal of select few MNOs have ulterior motives. Neither DCG nor the rest of the network has any obligation, legally or otherwise, to follow that. What's missing here is the will of the network. This is what I meant in my comment earlier.

This group of MNOs appears to be attempting to speak for the rest of the network in an inappropriate fashion. This is why Dash is set up the way it is, you poll the entire network to see what they want. The creation of this proposal does not have the majority of the MNOs' support, throwing an 'official sounding name' like DTP onto it doesn't make it any more representative, and in fact makes it less so.

If I'm correct, this is basically subverting the entire will of the network at the hands of a couple MNOs. Again, this sounds like an attack.

Mindblowing how five out of six Dash Trust Protectors had no issue with creating a decision proposal for a certain number of masternode operators (who by the way are to this date still unknown to the public), connecting the Dash Trust directly to that decision proposal, paying for the 5 Dash proposal fee from what i assume is the Dash Trust operational budget, without any thought on how this would reflect on the integrity of the Dash Trust or on the damage it does to the Dash Trust relationship with both Dash Core Group and with the Dash community, who both were not informed about this internal DTP vote or informed about the plan to create a decision proposal.

Mindblowing how all six Dash Trust Protectors seem to have no issue with one of their own Dash Trust Protectors commenting under his own name on that very same decision proposal (a clear conflict of interest).

So many things that just mindblowing gone wrong with this decision proposal.

I don't understand why it would be so mindblowing. They got requests from MNOs to execute their power to fix perceived problems with DCG. Whether these problems are real or not is irrelevant at this point. What matters is that a number of MNOs saw problems and demanded action.

So what to do as TP? Ignore them? Discuss it to death in non-representative forums and listen to the few with the loudest voice? (Just count in here how many posts are by the same users.) Or put a binding proposal up for the entire MNO network to vote on?

I think going the latter route is prudent. If you don't like it, vote No and move on. What's the big fuss?

>Whether these problems are real or not is irrelevant at this point.

No, this is definitely still relevant. 'Fait accompli' is a terrible reason to vote for something, as well as a terrible reason for submitting a proposal. Being irrational is never a justification to vote 'Yes!' and always sufficient to vote 'No!'

'So what to do as TP ?'

Inform those masternode operators that creating decision proposals and paying for the proposal fee is not in the mandate of the Dash Trust Protectors and advice those masternode operators to either raise the 5 dash proposal fee themselves or wait for the lowering of the proposal fee to just 1 dash and then create a decsion proposal.

Using the Dash Trust as a backdoor like this just to drive through a decision proposal, is just asking for trouble and further exploitation.

Also i don't understand how the Dash Trust Protectors can deviate so strongly from 'reassign the DCG board if the masternodes instruct it to do so' to launching a decision proposal themselves, thereby directly influencing that decison proposal among masternode operators.

Sounds to me this does not belong to the mandates of the Dash Trust Protectors and can be seen as an abuse of power.

Dash Core Group CFO, Glenn Austin has confirmed that if this Trust Protector governance proposal is approved by the masternode network, that he will respect the vote.

Source - https://www.dashcentral.org/p/DashCoreGroupCompProposalAug_Nov

I want more transparency from DCG but this is an incredibly weird way to do it.

IDK how to vote to be honest, on one hand I don't think this accomplishes anything. Its a pretty arbitrary cut between the sides of DCG.

On the other hand I want more detailed breakdowns of expenses from DCG so we can actually understand what we are paying for.

I wish this proposal just compelled each team to put in their own proposal with their own breakdown of cost and deliverables.

The simple solution to your problem is to vote 'No!' on this proposal and write/support another proposal with finer granularity. DCG has never defied the will of the MNOs before that I'm aware of. They may have been sluggish to respond in the past, but eventually, everything we've asked of them has been granted within reason.

So if you truly desire more transparency than the Q'ly calls, then a better-written, neutral, non-shill proposal should receive your support instead of this one, which is loaded with COI.

My decision would be made easier if I knew there was another proposal in the works that did that. Voting no opens up the possibility the DCG will see this as MNO not wanting a greater degree of granularity and transparency.

I feel like we have learned that surprise dropping decision proposals is a bad idea. This should have been discussed more heavily in an open forum before being posted.

I don't think you can assume this will be perceived as a mandate to DCG to be more opaque. It seems much more likely this is a shot across the bow of the organization to watch out.

You can look at how the proposal fee reduction process happened to quell your fears. Someone came up with a complicated proposal to lower the fee and it failed, then the simple proposal later on passed.

>Voting no opens up the possibility the DCG will see this as MNO not wanting a greater degree of granularity and transparency.

Which is not a bad thing. The fact that there is no such proposal and hasn't been (at least in recent times) indicates that the MNOs really don't want that. Which is also fine. Not every MNO agrees that DCG hasn't been transparent. In fact, I'd argue that the evidence points to them being the most transparent core team in crypto.

I bet the monero community is wishing for even a fraction of our transparency now that their lead maintainer and mymonero wallet operator is sitting in jail on fraud charges waiting for extradition.

>I feel like we have learned that surprise dropping decision proposals is a bad idea. This should have been discussed more heavily in an open forum before being posted.

On this we both heavily agree. There has been quite the push to 'move fast and break things' since Nov of last year. And with the proposal fee lowered to 1 Dash, this trend can only increase in pace. What fun! There are so many battles ahead!!

Well see that is where we disagree. I do not think it is fine. IMO the last few years would have played out quite differently had we been getting granular insights into DCGs departments and how the overall DCG compensation was being split between the different groups.

What differences would you have liked to see? I don't believe that MNOs are tasked with micromanaging DCG. Their mandate is to develop the network as they see fit. We don't have the collective financial or technical skills, nor the closeness required to perform that task imo.

I would have personally appreciated not being lied to by DCG management about how far along they were in designing and building platform.

If each part of the organization had its own proposal and deliverables it would have become clear much earlier that we were not were close to platform release at all.

Where is the evidence that they've lied? They have explicitly refused to put out timelines until very recently due to mishandled expectations from their customers (us). However, they have also apologized for their over eager prognostications. I have seen no evidence of malicious or dishonest behavior and I request you provide such at this time.

Further, I disagree completely that "separate organizational proposals" would've helped in this regard at all. That logic doesn't follow. Having a 'separate proposal' per business unit would not increase your or my technical acumen with regards to timeline prognostications.

In fact, it would likely only allow our competition the opportunity to gaslight the network and pretend that features that invalidate their coins were 'not worth it'.

Just like lysergic lies and attacks all of the third world proposals in spite of the easily verifiable fact that the third world is where the VAST MAJORITY of our adoption has come from since 2018. Such dishonesty cannot be ignored and it is imo naive of you to assume that such wouldn't be the case.

I have long said we need a separate Dash Marketing Group. I have long said that DCG should focus exclusively on development.

With that being said, I am voting NO. This is not the way to approach it.

DCG still needs marketing and business dev functions to be a good dev team. It helps inform what they build and prioritize. It is just that the NETWORK should not be reliant on DCG for marketing and business dev. Nor should we be reliant on DCG personal to perform any the role within the DAO. They should not be on the DIF. They should not be trust protectors. This should be obvious.

We need a new group or groups for marketing and business development. The solution is not to break up DCG. It is to introduce competition to dash funds for different functions/services.

Anyone that can put forth a competent dash marketing group or another dash business dev group for their respective region or industry will get my support.

DCG attempting to grow their marketing or business dev beyond product-market fit research and talking about the features they've developed will get no support from me.

Have to agree, this looks like a case of DTP overreach, let's see what MNO consensus decidesd, they need to come back with a more nuanced position than this for me to get on board.

From someone who was a C-Level at DCG, a TP, and PO of one of the larger DFOs...I can see exactly why this is being raised by TPs in terms of feelings of being elected to ensure the network's interests, the amount of pressure (and DMs) telling them to reign in DCG, and how DCG proposals are the obvious point of control there. Also I can totally understand the opposition from DCG people or strong supporters where they're embattled to deliver and any change or even making more effort on proposals is time that could be spent getting back on track on delivery which I know the devs and their support staff are working overtime to do.

But one thing I can say is that really the DCG proposals do need to change. Every other DFO has to make serious effort to write proposals to say why they want money each cycle and what they're going to do with it (each Incubator proposal took me like a week of research and planning to try to make a good case and ensure we were delivering value). Contrary to it being some kind of nuke to DCG to need to do that, all it would do would be increase transparency / accountability / **performance**, not this kinda arrogant mentality where they are above the basic principles of the system we're all using. This is the reality... I don't think it's about defunding or firing anyone, actually each verticle in DCG should be on its own proposal, we shouldn't allow any DFO to be essentially above the system, it will just grow and become less efficient. And we need a body like TPs at the Network level to start to police that, who's elected and operates on their **own** proposals to handle any DFO that's 'too big to fail'

So I support this, in fact it's just tip of the iceberg of bring productivity / performance back to Dash as a whole I think, I think it should be followed up by more proposals though, so everyone is accountable (and this shouldn't be used to try to defund anyone in particular, it should be the MNOs decision who and what gets funded by having the information and choices to do that over the long term for everyone working for governance money)

I'll just add another thing that we should squash this myth that proposals are just about defunding... proposals are the inventor relation, the value proposition, they provide the information and essentially the contract on what someone is going to offer to the MNOs, for how much, and the MNOs agree or not. Not having granular proposals in DCG is the crux of the lack of transparency / accountability problem - if a business unit in DCG (e.g. Platform) doesn't have a direct connection to the people funding them, how do the MNOs know if they're being funded enough, what issues they're having, what they're plans are (not higher ups in some general organization). Ironically rather than defunding it could lead to **more** funding where its needed... either way, direct proposals are the solution, and ofc DCG people will say its a waste of time etc... actually its essential.

...and ditch the 60% cap aka "tax" on the gov system. Each bus unit in DCG should request to raise what it thinks it needs every quarter, and make a value proposition for that. Use Glenn's talents to manage things even handle the bulk of the proposals / money side, just start to distribute the representation and financial decision making to the people doing it and let the MNOs interface, converse and support them to get the value we need.

I think the way DFOs have been treated by MNOs in the past nicely highlights why it is not realistic to expect ever more granular reporting and interfacing between DFOs and MNOs. Doing this is both inefficient and ineffective, because the reality is that votes are cast with little real research or understanding of the work being done, based primarily on group affiliations and subjective impressions of the parties involved. Often (and particularly here on DC) the loudest voices control the narrative, and I think that is how the TPs were influenced into posting this (so far) incredibly unpopular proposal. These problems will continue until we can improve the governance system to the point where civilized, moderated discourse and objective metrics are at its core.

The issue is that there are people in the network, people with MNs, who are colluding in the background to destroy Dash and make it less effective, so that our competition no longer has to be embarrassed by our success.

Look, I get it. This sounds highly conspiritorial. But think about it. Dash is the fastest coin with proof of work, optional privacy while still having full transparency. I mean, that eliminates several competitors right off the bat.

BCH, Nano, and monero can't compete, at all because of the way they're structured. So what will they do? Sell and buy Dash? Admit they made a mistake when they fell for the fud from monero? Nope. That would require them to be good, honest people.

But they can definitely bribe and coerce MNOs into self-destructive behavior. Do you think this is beneath them?

https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/ozburb/feels_bad_man_hope_he_gets_out_soon/

There is Riccardo fluffypony Spagni in JAIL for committing $100k worth of invoice fraud. He worked as an IT manager for a company in South Africa called 'Cape Cookies'. He basically overcharged the company to pay their business invoices and pocketed the difference.

This is scummy, scammy and criminal behavior. This is the 'former' (rollseyes) lead maintainer and potential founder of monero (no one knows who 'thankful_for_today' really was). The top of Dash's loudest competition is soon to be a convicted criminal. He's already fled justice and been captured.

There is NO HONOR among thieves. These people are not right in the head. They are criminals, they are selfish assholes and they are not going to stop until they can keep pretending like their terrible, crappy coins are 'the top'.

Manipulating the price of Dash to always be under monero, even though Dash has 1000x the adoption that monero has. Coming into DC, pushing comments from non-mnos like grandmasterdash and bchamz. These are corrupt actions and it lets you know who and what's behind this. People who genuinely want Dash to succeed to do things like that. Because they know how bad they would be for everyone.

The only people who don't care about that are people who hate Dash and want to see it die. The only thing is they can't be forthcoming with their motives for obvious reasons. They're going to keep attacking us, attacking DCG, and attacking every weakpoint in the network until we're gone. Conflict of interest is indeed the most powerful weapon against us.

Hi - it not possible to edit comments so i'll leave this here as a second post.

After reading this proposal in more detail and lot of the comments, I think there are some issues here.

I think its valid that its not obvious why / where this proposal is coming from - if thats TPs it should have been an open process. Plus even though they're elected to do this kind of thing in principle, they haven't stated this anywhere in writing and they're not really acountable to the Network for it either, I mean who has even seen the legal paperwork to know if its worth anything, and they have never raised a Proposal or communicated with the Network themselves. Plus there are commenters saying how TPs only have a legal mandate - well that's wrong because obviously decentralized global network superceeds any paperwork in a particular jurisdiction (thats the whole point...) but again, there is no written mandate for this or accountable / transparent representation of what TPs mandate is.

Secondly, just on the implementation, I think it could be seen as just opening up few individuals to be defunded, and leaves huge areas lumped together like 'development' which can be anything from integrating a 3rd party to maintaing a server to making changes to the Dash protocol. While I support increase in accountability and transparency of DCG, actually way beyond this, I don't think this achieves what we need on it's own, and such changes should be more thought out / finessed / planned in an open way and with full transparency as I mentioned, especially as theres internal change going on right now with Sam taking CTO slot (which I have high hopes to start supporting Browser/Incubator better now) which its right that if some major changes came out of this in the near term could be disruptive to that.

Therefore what i've done is created a draft Rules doc to setup the TPs with their own DFO. This was something I suggested when I was a TP but never got around to doing (actually it was a bounty on Incubator already but it was low priority). I've sent this to the TPs with suggestion they finish it and raise their own proposal.

Actually based on the Rules I just created, this proposal wouldn't be valid within the TP remit. Take a look at the draft anyway, it's open to public comment so anyone including DCG people can comment... I hope the TPs can get this finalized and we can have actual network representation in a elected / open way.

Draft DTP Rules: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1jtGE9C61M7b4mnfDgqVTY746WMGyMT59uBYaW4rsOLA/edit?usp=sharing

Although better than status quo, this proposal does not go near far enough.

As a legal entity, I believe DCG itself goes against the ethos of this project. I get the point that DCG somehow gives DASH legitimacy in the financial world, but this is not what is important for longevity of the project. Appearing legitimate will not defend DCG from central banks. Sooner or later DASH will be seen as a competitor to CBDCs and then the Fed/U.S. gov’t will come after DCG. Why? Because they can. It will not matter that DCG has been paying its taxes and following regulations up until then. The U.S. gov’t will make new regulations that will make it to where DCG can no longer function legally. Then it will either need to shut down or try to fight the U.S. gov’t. If DCG fights, it will need to hire a new c-staff position, a CLO, and there will be proposals for attorney fees, court costs and possibly fines. And in the end it will probably have to shut down anyway.

Why leave this project open to such obvious vulnerabilities?

I believe Eric Voorhees has the right idea with ShapeShift. Ryan should follow his lead. Decentralize DCG and dissolve it as a registered corporation.

i wholeheartedly agree with all you wrote 100%
we should never have incorporated anything, never created any foundation or institution.
hell, we should never have patented anything, not even as a 'defensive measure'
and we should never have wasted any precious Dash for attorneys, lawyers or legal advise.
this is all just a bunch of BS ultimately leading us nowhere.
its impossible to win against those govt motherfuckers by playing THEIR GAME and adhereing to THEIR RULES, which they constantly CHANGE because their ultimate objective is to destroy every competition and every 'cattle trying to leave the animal farm' aka tax slavery of our slavemaster overlords.
creating all those centralized legal entities will only paint us a target on our back and offer the govt attackable surface, while violating the very principle of decentralization, and it goes against values like freedom, voluntary choice, rejecting the tyranny of the majority etc.
not to mention that it not only violates the spirit of Satoshi - but literally rapes in its a*s

we live in times where THE LAW is in the hands of the greatest bastards IMAGINABLE.
therefore, we must not only expect them to come after ALL CRYPTO (except CBDC) soon,
but everyone who has three braincells KNOWS it will happen with a high probability at least 95%.
and all those Dash legal entities will be an easy target for them when that day comes.

and of course, one doesn't need to be a genius to understand, paying taxes to the enemy is playing a fools game.
because all it accomplishes, is making oneself weaker, while it makes the enemy powers stronger.

The majority of the people in power in 'the west' are all corrupt, bought and paid for and have sold out their fellow humans. These people are what's known as 'Monsters (tm)'. A monster is someone who forgoes their humanity for selfish reasons.

This is what it means to sell out and its why the enemy always uses corruption to accomplish their tasks. Because when you're corrupt, the blame for your actions falls on you, not them. Its also a devious strategy, that real humans wouldn't use.

The world is separating between monsters, people who only care about themselves, and real humans. Choose your side.

And what do I mean by 'real humans'? Real humans have emotions like empathy, happiness, joy, love, self-sacrifice for the greater good, strength of will and character ("I will not do this because it will hurt others, even if I benefit"), as well as more negative emotions like greed, avarice, selfishness and the like. Negative emotions aren't necessarily 'bad', there are times in life where its necessary to be angry, mean and unforgiving.

MONSTERS ARE PEOPLE WHO KILL ALL THEIR GOOD EMOTIONS and only focus on the bad ones so as to take advantage of other people. If you are ONLY always attacking while others only attack when they need to, you'll be at an advantage compared to them. So long as you can trick them that they're not being attacked that is.

I very much agree with this, especially how things are playing out lately. Another option is to offer a massive compensation scheme to relocate all US based developers. Perhaps a hard sell but not impossible.

Individual developers are not easy targets. DCG is.

True but if there are key people choosing between emigration or leaving dash..

You're not a MNO nor a PO, so you being here and commenting is a conflict of interest.

Another sign of Conflict of Interest, it appears that Rango is deliberately hiding the upvotes on my comments keeping them at 1.

I can get downvoted to oblivion, but nobody who supports a similar line of reasoning as I do can visibly express that support. This is censorship and if true, implicates Rango as being a bad actor, along with his refusal to limit comments to MNOs and current POs only.

Its very easy to identify COI, because actions ALWAYS speak louder than words. Always.

In all my dealing with rango i found him/her neutral and impartial.

Dash Central does have one weak point in my eyes : the ability of masternode operators with multiple masternodes to create several Dash Central accounts and gain additional comment upvote / downvote capability. But that has always been the case.

Nathaniel Luz of Dash Nigeria attempted to get me to engage a similar fraud before DashNigeria was defunded. Of course, I told him no.

I would like to say the same, but its clear to me by this individuals refusal to address MNO's wishes as well as the funky upvote actions (I've upvoted several of my own posts over the months that were at 1 upvote and it stays at 1 upvote). Of course, now that I've called it out, suddenly I 'get' 4-5 upvotes on two rather innocuous comments relative to this proposal.

Could it be that upvoting your own comments simply doesn't count? It's a conflict of interest anyway, I'm sure you understand.

Its not. Upvoting your own comment works. Its also not a conflict of interest. Self-interest is not conflicted. Self-interest is only a conflict of interest when you hide it in order to manipulate others into helping you fulfill your goals.

Like someone who hides their self-interest in downvoting reasonable comments so that others won't be able to objectively see how many other people agree with them (or not).

>Its not. Upvoting your own comment works.

Specifically, when I upvote my comment and it has 0 or less votes, the upvote will count. But when its just 1, it will not budge.

Its not a matter of going to 2 and then going back to one in a couple of minutes (downvote brigade).

It just doesn't go over one. I've observed this behavior repeatedly over the months. The only one who could pull that off is someone with access to the backend db.

I have had this happen in my experience as well, but I have always assumed that probably someone else voted between when I loaded the page and when I actually clicked for that particular post. The more you vote on freshly posted stuff, the more likely it is to happen. At least in my experience. Either that or there is something going on behind the scenes just to mess with you, which is slightly less believable.

>Either that or there is something going on behind the scenes just to mess with you, which is slightly less believable.

Right. It was hard for me to believe as well, that's why I waited months before saying anything. It seems that during one of my last proposal commenting sessions (months ago), I got 'too many upvotes'.

A shill, geert, even called me out on it and said like '6 upvotes for this trash comment, you have minions my friend. You have minions.'

Which is completely backwards. I have no friends in this network. Nobody whom I talk to frequently, collude together with or who is willing to voice support for my comments (with a couple rare and welcome exceptions), so that accusation must've been projection.

I hate to make this accusation, I really do. But if it looks like a duck...

I ask you again, are you a MNO?

;)

Can someone explain why CEO would not be part of the DCG dev team?

That part doesn't make sense to me. DCG is 90% a dev team at the moment. Right? Seems like you'd have a separate CEO of the other organization as well.

This part seems poorly thought out. Or it is presented purposefully bad as a round about way to remove Ryan Taylor from DCG. If that is the purpose we should vote specifically on that.

I'm not sure why this would be a bad thing for the network. I can only see this as being overly positive. This seems like a very good idea.

Let me put it this way. I'm confident if DCG had been submitting salary compensation proposals by department over the last few years, masternode owners would have a far greater understanding of the work being done by each department with more frequent updates. Each department would now be more optimized and efficient due to increased accountability and transparency by having to report and request funding from the network.

As the DCG CFO has commented on this proposal in August 2018, DCG had previously submitted separate department proposals for funding. So it's not like this is a radical change here that is being proposed that's never been done before. It doesn't damage or harm DCG at all. DCG still will have the same ability to receive same funding as before.

I'd also prefer for DCG development to have a separate proposal so the CTO is much more accountable for meeting roadmap deadlines and fully incentivized to perform at their best keeping the network updated. I wish we had this before!

In the last DCG quarterly call, forward guidance was given that DCG will be hiring and scaling both the Biz Dev and Marketing team with new hires. So moving forward in to the future this was unavoidable in my opinion. A large umbrella proposal absorbing most of the treasury funding providing salary compensation for multiple verticals was always going to be an issue.

Having separate department proposals can only benefit the network. I agree that it's healthy for the masternode network to have the choice to decide where funding is allocated than not have the ability to decide at all.

The masternode network not only expects, but demands other Marketing and Biz Dev Dash Funded Organizations (DFO) that request network funding to report to Dash Watch on their deliverables so the network can objectively measure their performance and make informed decisions.

So why should the largest funded DFO being DCG not be doing the same? It will set a good precedent for others to follow suit and we are constantly requesting as a network for DCG to provide more updates as it's very unclear what is actually happening behind the scenes.

I honestly don't see this proposal as a major conflict or being an issue with voting Yes. As MNOs, we want to make informed decisions and having more information to hand. Having the ability to decide as a decentralized project can only be a good thing right?

As MNO's we should be freely able to allocate network funding based on the merit of hard work, not blind DFO affiliation. That's centralization of the highest order.

Evan always talked about competing development teams to create a free market to attract the best talent for the network.

So why is that a bad thing? I can only conclude it's not.

This is ultimately about job security, which is a protectionist mindset and does not serve in the best interest of a decentralized network. The DAO network funding was constructed this way by design. The network allocates funding to those who add value to the network. An all or nothing approach on an increasing organisation with several department verticals absorbing a large proportion of available treasury funding isn't a good look.

If these departments are doing a good job there is absolutely nothing to fear. However as an MNO in a down-market for example I want to have the option to choose where I want to designate where I feel funding is needed most. Masternodes currently don't have that option. This proposal will provide that.

If we're going to tout decentralized governance as a Dash feature we need to be really about it.

"If we're going to tout decentralized governance as a Dash feature we need to be really about it." absolutely on page with this... because centralization is trust and trust is risk... to your money. In recent years its common in Dash to see people trash decentralization... a trend that is exemplified by how DCG is setup and operating. And we can see the results... principles are important.

Its always 'attack DCG' with you. Why? Why are you so against our network? As someone wrote on dashpay earlier, "Hey Andy, can you stop attacking Dash plz? thx"

Yes. Please stop attacking Dash.

A large number of MNOs and community members asked the DTPs to present this governance proposal to the network as DTPs serve in the best interest of the network. There was consent and approval to move forward with this proposal.

This proposal is simply asking the masternode network to clearly establish if they want DCG to improve its transparency and accountability to the network by submitting future salary compensation funding requests separately as indicated in Figure 2 in the proposal description.

If we focus on the issue at hand, does the masternode network believe that this proposal will enable MNOs to more objectively and transparently evaluate DCG’s performance or not?

Ultimately, only Dash masternode owners (DCG's employers) can decide what is in the best interest of the network moving forward.

The Trust Protectors will respect the vote.

That is why you used the wording "improve" in the proposal. DTPs should be neutral, this has the potential to cause a lot of damage. "A large number of MNOs" how was this documented? What is the process for a proposal to get officially presented by trust protectors? This all seems quite arbitrary to me. It has the potentialbto cause a lot of damage foe something that is a non issue. What do the bylaws of the trust say about making proposals like this?

I think this has the potential to both damage the trust people have in the Dash Trust Protectors and at the same time drive a wedge and further divide the Dash community.

Is this really in the best interest of the Dash network or is this in the best interest of a certain number of masternode operators, who are hiding behind the DashTrustProtectors name and are abusing the Dash Trust to avoid having to pay the proposal fee themselves ?

Ironically the same people that are behind this decision proposal could have waited a few months and then created this decision proposal for just 1 Dash and without involving the Dash Trust Protectors that are now moving in very shady waters.

The DashCollective have no affiliation with this proposal.

Yet you operate in the same shady manner, as I exposed in your 1-dash-fee proposal. GrandmasterDash supposedly 'had no affiliation' with your selfishly and incorrectly named 'Dashcollective', yet you were clearly aligned in some way, as you allowed him to spam your proposal with 148 comments in your favor.

There is a difference between The Trust Protectors respecting the vote and The Trust Protectors overstepping their own legally-defined mandates and influence the vote beforehand, by creating this decision proposal themselves.

Where can I learn more about this legally-defined mandate?

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/dash-core-group-legal-structure-details.39848/#post-193885

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/dash-core-group-legal-structure-details.39848/#post-197228

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/dash-core-group-legal-structure-details.39848/

The copy of the legal document is linked inside this post

Instead of removing DCG, the Dash network and MNOs need to find a way to catalog and remove all the MNOs with conflicts of interest that have plagued our network over the years. There has been a LOT of damage done by these individuals who pretend to be our friends while they collude in their secret echo chambers to destroy the rest of the network.

A small list of such damage:

1. George Donnelly and Ed Stover attempting and almost succeeding at destroying our growth in Venezuela, colluding from Colombia.

2. Joel Valenzuela and Mark Mason grifting the DAO for 320 Dash a month or the equivalent of ~$51,000 USD PER MONTH for a 'Dash News' website. What adoption can we realistically point to with 'DashForceNews' as the cause?

3. Joel Valenzuela attacking and destroying DashBoost to prevent third world proposals from getting funding

4. lysergic, realmrhack and others railing against otherwise good proposals for NO REASON at all. Attacking Dash retail, DashVenezuela, preventing updates to DashWatch so I can't make arguments about our adoption, even 'bugs' with DashCentral and DashNexus to hide support/or lack thereof for proposals and detrimental comments exposing their corruption.

I say this is a small list right off the top of my head, but there's more.

The next decision vote should be to form a paid committee to examine the comments and come to a judgment on who should have their MNs permanently revoked from the network.

Identify them and raise their PoSe score until they're banned. The longer we wait the more destruction they will bring with their selfish corruption.

My 2 duffs

While I understand your frustration, installing paid committees to revoke voting rights of "undesirables" is DEFINITELY NOT the way. A decentralized project needs to be resilient enough to deal with different opinions and even trolls organically and uphold the code-is-law tenet.

Thanks for the feedback. It is just an initial idea. So if I understand what you're saying, you believe that revoking the MNO priviledges of bad actors goes against the spirit of the network?

I disagree. These individuals are clearly conflicted in their interests, and they have been active for years attempting to subvert our processes using specious reasoning, emotional arm-twisting and terrorism.

Notice for example, how DashQueenApp boldly accepts and signs messages with 'your favorite emotional terrorist', acknowleding their role and tactics while attempting to hide behind sarcasm to make you think 'its just a joke'.

Hiding behind 'just jokes' has been a tried and true shill tactic popularized by the monero community. Further, I'm not advocating that we try to 'take their Dash away'. Just ban their MNs.

The network already has this functionality, indeed 299 MNs are banned as we type. That means that this is still in keeping with the 'code-is-law' tenet, since this functionality is already coded.

Thanks again for your reply!

Those bans are for clearly defined and algorithmically verifiable problems with the MN. Namely, not provisioning the service that MNs get paid for. The censorship committee you have in mind is an entirely different story. Not remotely comparable.

And for someone complaining loudly about censorship after being unable to upvote your own comments, installing a censorship committee doesn't seem to jibe with your own values.

>Those bans are for clearly defined and algorithmically verifiable problems with the MN.

Certainly, but MNOs who vote and argue against the best interests of the network due to their own conflicts of interests would also qualify as a 'verifiable problem' with the MNO. Look, if you're attacking Dash's adoption in Venezuela, Dash's DAOs in the treasury, or DCG without cause, then you're WORSE than a malfunctioning MN.

> not provisioning the service that MNs get paid for.

Right, one of those paid-for services is voting on proposals. If you are not voting with the best interests of the network in mind but your own conflicted interest, that would be a similar lack of service provisioning.

>And for someone complaining loudly about censorship after being unable to upvote your own comments

You call that comment 'complaining loudly'? Man you really lay it on thick don't you? You don't want any MNOs to be banned for COI, you mock my legitimate claims of censorship (hiding upvotes to manipulate other people's view of the discussion IS censorship) and you subtly defend conflicted individuals, all while refusing to answer the question of whether or not you have a masternode...That makes you a hypocrite.

>installing a censorship committee doesn't seem to jibe with your own values.

Its not a 'censorship committee' and it doesn't disagree with my values at all. Anyone who is abusing their position to tear down the network should be banned. Why do you disagree with that?

Question 2 and I'll ask again for the third time, do you have a masternode? It is dishonest debating to argue while ignoring the arguments of your opponents. You turn this into a farce when you refuse to identify if you should be here or not...

Also, this wouldn't be a permanent job. It would be a one time thing to remove those who have PROVEN to be bad actors through conflict of interest.

Anyone who is staunchly against our growth in Venezuela and refuses to see our growth there, for example would be a good start.

We can't afford to sit idly by and let these selfish idiots ruin our coin just because they're jealous and butthurt about losing. Don't you agree?

Btw, are you a MNO?

Fuck you too, brother!

Good to see you have no defense against the accusations.

you've been banned from of every dash related platform right? You think you'd survive the purge? lol

I was literally banned for insightful posts just like this one:

https://www.reddit.com/r/dashpay/comments/6t1a8y/explaining_the_dash_hatred_from_litecoin_monero/

58 upvotes in r/dashpay. Almost all of my threads in that subreddit were similarly upvoted and approved of. Even joel valenzeula complimented that post.

I documented my unfair banning from r/dashpay in this thread in r/btc, where I also recieved support:

https://www.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/b3qnar/stay_vigilant_rbtc_say_it_aint_so_dashpay/

If you disagree with my rationale or can find any reason why I should've been banned then, once again, I'm all ears.

Only from r/dashpay that I'm aware of. And as I documented, that banning was carried out punitively and against the very rules of the subreddit. Calling flesnt a liar is NOT a bannable offense under dashpay's rules.

As long as you can prove the accusation, which I did, then banning is completely inappropriate and a COI. What's more, permanently banning an MNO from that discussion platform is also a conflict of interest, as that subreddit only exists to serve the Dash community.

Further, I have never done damage to the Dash community. Unless you have something in mind you'd like to share with everyone. I'm all ears.

Once more, are you a MNO?

Finally, my call was to remove MNOs with CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, not those who've 'been banned from forums'. If you can show me either via evidence or reason where I have a conflict of interest, I won't even wait for a proposal. I'll spin down my masternode on my own immediately. THAT'S how much I care about and love Dash. Can you say the same?

We should embrace increased decentralization when an opportunity presents itself. Voting yes.

Easy yes.
I've be asking about doing something like this for years. I was originally told if the DCG proposal got so many down votes they would split up the proposal ask between separate departments, nobody wanted to take the risk of defunding development so nothing ever came of it.
After the trust was fully up and running I asked DCG for clarification on exactly what number or percent of downvotes they need to receive to split the proposal ask into different departments. I was told that that was not the case anymore because the trust protectors now had the ability to handle these kinds of issues and it was up to them to act. And here we are.

Like twitter, we need an edit button ;)
#Rango #BeenAsking

You are incorrect with your statement that the DCG proposal was never split out between separate departments.

The August 2018 DCG proposal received "no" votes greater than 10% of total votes cast. Because of this, I submitted separate proposals for the September 2018 cycle related to Devs & Ops, administration, business dev/marketing/customer support. All 3 separate proposals passed with overwhelming support.

Here are links to refresh your memory:
https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/core-team-compensation-devs-and-ops-october.40499/
https://www.dashcentral.org/p/coreteamcomp101801

Trust protectors were intended to initiate change through the following mechanisms:
- Own the shares of DCG
- As shareholders, reassign the DCG board if the masternodes instruct it to do so
- Assign or hire the trustee of the Trust
- Hold other passive assets that ultimately belong to the network such as patents or trademarks assigned to it by
DCG or other legal entities, and enforce any associated licensing requirements

"You are incorrect with your statement that the DCG proposal was never split out between separate departments."

That’s not what I’m saying.
It has been split up multiple different ways over the years as well as being combined at different times. When the question was first asked we were told if the proposal got so many percent downvotes they would split the proposal up. This was the policy for a long time, you seem to be suggesting it still is?
Last time I asked if this was still the policy I was told no because now the Trust Protectors had mechanisms to make necessary changes with DCG. I believe it was on the Dash Forum.
Either way I like how this current proposal structures the split.


“Trust protectors were intended to initiate change through the following mechanisms:”

Anyone is free to offer up a Decision Proposal. The Trust Protectors must have thought it was pretty important to choose this mechanism.
We vote and then we move on. This is the way ;)

“The August 2018 DCG proposal received "no" votes greater than 10% of total votes cast”

I don’t remember exactly when I asked the question, I think it was after that. To clarify I will say in the last couple of years nothing came of it.

With an increasingly growing DCG requesting the majority of the total available treasury budget, having more oversight on each DCG department's performance and deliverables can only help us make more informed voting decisions as MNO's.

My rationale is: Having the option to decide where to allocate funding is better than NOT having an option.

Therefore I feel it's in the best interest of the Dash masternode network to have the freedom to decide where to prioritize DAO funding.

If each DCG department is adding value to the network as expected, there is nothing to fear or be concerned about as a network. As of now, we have zero ability as a decentralized network to show our approval or disproval for each DCG department in the overall DCG Salary compensation request.

Having more transparency and having the ability as a network to vote should be encouraged, not frowned upon.

For example - I wouldn't want to hinder DCG development by downvoting DCG salary proposal if I was unsatisfied with DCG Biz Dev performance.

I'm personally voting YES as I think this would be very healthy for Dash as a decentralized network, while still showing active support for DCG. Having DCG more accountable via each department in reporting to the network requesting salary funding can only be a good thing for Dash and help improve performance, allowing the network to provide more feedback and input.

Bottom line - I believe if this governance proposal is approved by the network it would actually be a positive change that will help the network be better in the long run.

So it seems that both Mark Mason and Joel Valenzuela are both still on their 'retaliation campaign' for being defunded. They've already got their payouts, so they just ride the MN rewards while subverting the rest of the network with specious arguments.

You are entitled to your personal opinion, although, I strongly disagree. I think the important question here is why is this presented as "DashTrustProtectors" when this is clearly a personal proposal from you. Did you vote internally on this before going to the network? Where are the minutes of that meeting and vote? Our CTO and devs dont want this so you should stop pushing your personal opinion down their throats.

I'm happy to answer your concerns. I'm going to answer as directly and clearly as possible.

1. "this is clearly a personal proposal from you"

I personally did not write this proposal. I'm sure other Trust Protectors will be more than happy to confirm this.

2. "Did you vote internally on this before going to the network?"

This proposal has been submitted in an official capacity on behalf of the Trust Protectors. To be clear, the Trust Protectors had full knowledge and gave consent for this proposal to submitted to the network.

3. "you should stop pushing your personal opinion down their throats."

I'm not what this is in direct reference to beyond my proposal comment. I'm afraid I'm not sure what you mean. If you could kindly elaborate, I'm happy to answer.

As indicated in the proposal description, the Trust Protectors are doing the job they were elected to do on behalf of the network.

"Dash Trust Protectors (DTPs) received feedback from numerous MNOs and the network that keeping DCG accountable and transparent is difficult with dev/tech funding proposals being commingled with non dev/tech staff funding."

Even our new interim CTO acknowledges this in his initial comment.

"But I also think trust protectors were responding to a voice of discontentment in the network with this proposal and felt it was their obligation to poll the network."

This governance proposal isn't about individuals, it's about providing the masternode network with a clear choice to decide what they believe will be in the best interest of the network moving forward.

For clarity, I did comment on this proposal with my own personal thoughts as an MNO and TP with the conclusion that I came to as I've had time to contemplate the outcome of what this proposal would mean and achieve if approved by the network. As I mentioned in my comment. I do believe it's fully compatible to be both supportive of this governance proposal and DCG efforts.

I do personally believe this will make DCG more productive and more importantly allow the masternode network "its employers" to have a far greater understanding of the actual work that is being done with more direct updates and feedback loops.

As DCG continues to scale in the future, the greater the need will become more accountability and transparency. I also think it is wise and best practice for the largest funded entity that receives network funding to lead by example for new proposal owners that request funding from the network.

Transparency increases credibility and accountability. No emotion, just logic.

This does feel like both a conflict of interest and a clear misunderstanding of the Dash Protector Trust responsebilities by (some) of its members. This decision proposal could have easily been created, without the official 'DashTrustProtectors' label.

I am giving DCG till the end of the year to deliver. Voting No, but next year will be another story.

''This is a governance proposal submitted to the network by the Dash Trust Protectors based on feedback from the community to improve Dash Core Group's accountability and transparency.''

I only found the following discussion thread (which includes a still running poll) : https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/latest-dcg-accountability-transparency-discussions-in-discord-reddit.51850/#post-227731, which so far only has 16 votes. So i certain hope this decision proposal did not emerge due to that poll.

I am sad to see a proposal like this and would like an official statement outside of this platform. Was this voted on internally by the trust? It seems like a very bad idea. Why is the CEO of an organization not an important part of it. And how can people external to an organization made such a decision without any knowledge of the internal workings? Do our CTO and developers even want this? I am very dissapointed on this proposal.

I, as CTO, do not want this, and I doubt any developer inside DCG does. But I also think trust protectors were responding to a voice of discontentment in the network with this proposal and felt it was their obligation to poll the network. In my opinion let's just vote and move on.

That is interesting. I think you're right, there is a voice of discontent and I'm a part of it i.e. I have been voting No on DCG proposals. That's not ideal but this proposal passing would give me a bit more refinement on how I vote i.e. I don't actually want to de-fund devs, and I do want to see Ryan et al focus more on business / corporate side of things with fewer distractions. I'd also very much like to see a completely separate proposal for Dash Platform, but unfortunately I don't think that's going to happen.

I'm not voting either way on this just yet but I am inclined to vote Yes as it edges in the right direction. Whatever the outcome, I hope DCG can look at this and make some adjustments. The danger is, if DCG completely ignores what it being said here, then future proposals may prove more destructive.

I think DCG has made adjustments, I know I have in the last 2 weeks since becoming CTO. I'm enacting quite a few changes since then. I'm hoping that they will be fruitful. Ryan really does focus a lot more on the business corporate side than the dev side of the org, which is mostly under the control of the CTO.

MNOs are not devs or business experts. We have no business micromanaging DCG, and we certainly have no business potentially shuttering dash platform which is the killer app our jealous competition really doesn't want to see released.

Could you explain why you don't want this?

As you can see from above there are 4 people in Business dev + Marketing + CEO. I think our org would suffer without this representation. This is obviously a step in the direction of potentially defunding those departments which would cause chaos and would distract both DCG and the whole Dash ecosystem from our goals.

why do you assume dash marketing group would get defunded though?

I don't assume this.

Voting NO.

To me it seems like a bad idea to have MNO's directly vote over Dash Core Group funding for Marketing, Business Development and Biz dev, because they lack the information to make an informed decision.

MNO's do not know the ins and outs of each DCG department, specially with departments like Business Development often being bound to a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA), which prevent them to share that information to MNO's.

Just like dashvoice i would like to know how this proposal came to be, was it internally voted on by the trust ? Who of the trust protectors are behind this ?

>Voting NO.
Shocked! Are you also going to rant and rave like a lunatic on this proposal, or have you simmered down?

Glad to see I was right about you. Arguing emtionally like this with personal attacks indicates a severe conflict of interest on your part. If you had a genuine rationale and desire to improve Dash, you wouldn't jeopardize your chances by alienating those you wish to vote for this proposal.

You have a handful of votes, I won't dishonour myself by begging for them, fuck you.

Also, you dishonor yourself with every post here.

Thank you for reinforcing my point.

Instead of making unfounded personal accussations, why don't you just stay on topic and comment on this decision proposal. Thank you.

This proposal is presented as something that can improve DCG accountability and transparency.
I DO NOT see anything in this proposal that can improve both these factors and it has nothing to do with decentralization, as some trying to suggest. Decentralization is not defragmentation and experimental split of a united and well-working team. This might only create chaos.
I cannot imagine the separation of CEO and some parts of the company from other teams. This is a clear way to destroy the integrality of the entire DCG team.
Please vote NO.

In addition, the proposal owner is presented as "Dash Trust Protectors" who are the people behind the proposal and why did they NOT contact DCG first? This kind of partisan method has nothing to do with a Dash Trust Protectors legal mandate.

I would also like to remind that Dash Trust Protectors, as Glenn already wrote, were intended to initiate change through the following mechanisms:
- Own the shares of DCG
- As shareholders, reassign the DCG board if the masternodes instruct it to do so
- Assign or hire the trustee of the Trust
- Hold other passive assets that ultimately belong to the network such as patents or trademarks assigned to it by
DCG or other legal entities, and enforce any associated licensing requirements.

Re: "Reassign the DCG board if the masternodes instruct it to do so"

Maybe that is what would need to happen if DCG were to ignore a 'yes' result on this proposal.

I dont buy this argument that this is outside the scope of the duties of the TPs.

I haven't decided yet which way I will vote on this, but the responses from DCG members so far is making me lean towards yes.

What I am saying is that Dash DAO Irrevocable Trust is a legal entity that has defined certain legalstatus and Trust Protectors have their mandates described there. Here is a description shared a long time ago by Ryan: https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/dash-core-group-legal-structure-details.39848/#post-193885

Please vote as you think is good for the project. Please do not make your opinion based on emotions.

"However, at any time, the DCG board can be evaluated and / or replaced by the trust protectors via direction from the masternodes."

I don't mean to antagonize but it seems to me that if this proposal passes or even comes close to passing, then DCG will have to come up with some sort of compromise or face the possibility of the DCG board being removed or re-assigned. I'm not saying it will come to that and let's hope it doesn't happen that way, I'm just saying this should be seen as a wake up call.

I don't mean to antagonize but it seems to me that you're neither a MNO nor a proposal owner, so why are you here commenting?