Welcome!

I thought the DIF was going to submit new proposal(s). The governance question is now completely muddied by the change in vote. Please separate out the issues, it is hard to understand the will of the network when this didn't pass last cycle.

It appears that the MNO network do not want the DIF to have total autonomy in making investment decisions from this vote. There was 500.25 DASH still left in the budget so if MNOs wanted they could have voted this through.

1. Maintaining MNO network Decentralized decisions making on final investment Decisions by the DIF.

I voted "no" on this proposal primarily to ensure that MNOs maintain the final OK if an investment should be made or not y the DIF. Final MNO approval of a proposed investment ensures decentralization remains as one of our core values.

2. Polling request for Governance changes should never be mixed with funding requests

I would request that if there is a polling decision for the DIF or any other proposal going forward it should not be rolled up in the proposal as it has been here. Personally I feel the DIF lost some trust from the network by doing this and the DIF may also have de-funded themselves in the process also.

The polling decision is also not entirely clear when it is combined with a funding request. e.g. What happens if just one of the 3 funding requests were to go through? We cannot say if it was funded for the poll to change the governance system or it was funded to give DIF funds.

Personally I feel the DIF have enough investment money at the moment.

3. Clear DIF guidelines and procedures drafted and stored in GIT hub

I would like to see clear guidelines drafted and stored in the GIT repositories on working practises for the DIF. I think on of the first procedures that should be written out is a Polling decisions on a Governance change should *always* be in a separate polling decision proposal and not ever be combined with a funding request as it was done in this DIF proposal.

The reason for this is that it does not make it clear what the decision actually was. The only way we know for certain is a clear polling decision.

As I stated previously I feel there should have been a separate polling decision posted from this funding request. Here is my original text:

"To get a clear decision being made on MNO voting rights on DIF projects a separate decision proposal needs to have been raised that says the following:

Title: "Decision: Remove MNO rights to vote whether the DIF can invest in a project"

Description:

"Vote YES to remove MNO rights to vote on a DIF proposed investment and give the DIF complete autonomy on what they want to invest in"

Vote NO for MNOs wish to retain their right to vote whether the DIF can make an investment or not"

Another procedure document the DIF could consider writing up is its guidelines on how investment money will be made. e.g. The DIF should never make an investment that could jeopardise the network e.g. over extending on the investment and making agreements on investment for funds that the DIF does not currently hold in their fund reserves. If this ever happened then the network may have a legal obligation to continue to fund with more governance money because there was not enough money in the DIF itself. Therefore the DIF should have policies and procedures that this risk can never happen. This could be achieved by ensuring investments are only covered by current DIF reserves and include a statuary maintenance amount that will account for DASH price fluctuations of up to 50%. In addition reserves should be maintained for normal DIF functioning e.g. paying legal fees etc without the need to come to the network for more funds. I feel a more comprehensive set of written policies will help to build confidence in the DIF and improve transparency to the network.

4. Invest internally before externally
Before investing in external 3rd party companies the DIF may consider working on investments already within our governance system. This can be achieved by assisting MNOs making decisions on current proposals. This could help MNOs make better checks. This would also give the DIF practise in assessing proposals and learning for things to look out for. I also think that DASH Watch should also be involved to undertake background checks on all new proposal owners to confirm they are who they say they are and have the skills and experience they say they have. Then the DIF could undertake and investment appraisal. This would give the DIF valuable experience in assessing project and also help the MNO network make better decisions. The DIF would make a recommendation and the MNOs could then consider this recommendation when voting. This solves several problems in one go. The MNOs have more information on which to make a decision and we can make better quality decisions. In addition the DIF may be able to obtain IP rights and even advise proposal owners to improve their offer if they wish to get funding.

5. Network Owned Projects
I feel the DIF should also consider which DAO funded projects should be network owned so that if the proposal owners move on we still have the rights to the Intellectual property (IP). This would enable other teams to pick up where the last project owners left off. With network owned assets it would also inspire competition for teams to give the best price they can to run that service. It would mean we continuously will build our Digital assets that can be used by all future projects. This would require legal docs drafted up along with agreements on how the assets will be stored and made available to the network. DASH retail, run by ASH, is an excellent example of what we could be doing with all of our DAO funded projects.

6. There is no rush to make an investment decisions.
There will also be another investment opportunity. There will always be better investment opportunities. The DIF should not feel compelled to invest just because they have not invested in anything. We should only invest when there really is an excellent investment opportunity and at the same time ensuring that investment opportunity meets DASH's core values as a incorruptible crypto currency which I feel are the following:

DASH VALUES
1. Non corruptible (both now and for the future),
2. Radical transparency (in code and investment),
3. Decentralisation (not possible to exploit Dash by minority group of individuals),
4. Efficiency (both Investment and Coding efficiency)
5. Trustlessness (quality decisions can be made without the need to trust any one individual or group.
6. Payment solution - make tech usable by anyone.

There is still a lot of work an benefit the DIF can bring to the network by helping assess current proposal requests. Making contracts for IP ownership. Ensuring new proposal owners agree to store their assets in GIT hub and provide access to the network.

Outside of DCG and Dash Retail, we are loosing most of our IP rights on projects we are funding. By retaining IP rights this will have an immediate improvement of Efficiency to the network. Retention of value will also likely increase the DASH price since we are holding more Digital Assets that can be re-used by the entire network. Currently IP loss is a tremendous value drain on the network. The DIF could get involved in helping the network set up IP rights and ownership for all projects and to help setup Github repositories for all DAO funded projects so that we can pick them up when a project owners leaves. We also need to ensure that the DIF always have a master password to all DAO funded repositories.

There was more than one problem with this proposal, some voters, like me, wanted the governance proposal put separately, the DIF did NOT adjust their ask for the 7.14% block reward reduction, I have seen other comments here about that issue. Funding and governance need to be two separate items. Simple as that.

1/ Decentralisation can remain a core value whilst also delegating authority to DAO owned/controlled organisations. Decentralisation for the sake of it is very inefficient and costly, it also reduces quality and undermines the natural synergies created when centralised and specialist organisations work in tandem.

Decentralisation can be bad in two very clear ways:

It causes fragmentation - When organisations are fragmented, costs rise because economies of scale are lost and, as we’ve seen many times, we get duplication of efforts.
It results in reduced specialisation - Specialists perform better than generalists, especially in industries where the pace of change is fast. It’s that simple. They accumulate more experience in their speciality, and hence are more productive and produce better quality in less time. They keep up with the developments in their field, thus enabling a better pace of innovation.

The DIF will respect the decision of the network, but it doesn’t change the supervisors unanimous view that it’s counterproductive and will likely result in sub-optimal outcomes and perverse incentives versus delegating authority and allowing the DIF to specialise and deliver all the benefits that come with centralisation at an operational level.


2/ The previous governance change was requested in exactly the same manner during Q1 2020. The decision of whether or not to engage an investment consultant and employ a re-balancing strategy was part of an identically structured funding proposal in January. The DIF team saw no resistance from MNOs on this type of arrangement previously. I think it would be a shame if the MNOs as a whole saw this as a breach of trust, in the same way you do.

The governance change is very clear, as it was in the previous proposal in January, where the network agreed to allow us to totally overhaul the way we handle reserves on the balance sheet.

The outcome from this proposal is also very clear, which is great. A clear outcome is what was required, and achieved, for better or worse.

3/ Policies and procedures have been a work in progress for the DIF for months now and we have been working on a DIF Manual internally. As you can imagine, it’s a lot of work, and we are doing this for free, so patience is required. The plan is, of course, to open source these documents on github and for future changes to be tracked in a transparent manner.

The beauty of the github solution we are implementing is that anybody can help write and contribute to creating policy for the DIF, and the workflow will be such that you can personally contribute yourself and be part of shaping the governance of the DIF going forwards (all you need is a github account!).

4/ The DIF has reviewed a number of opportunities over the last 9 months which would have probably gone to the network proposal system in the absence of the DIF. We only found one opportunity that we considered viable for the network to consider, it was BTC-Echo.

In my opinion it’s currently the job of the MNOs to insist that POs structure themselves in a way that provides protection to the network. In 9 months since the DIF was founded we have NOT seen one instance where a PO has been asked/forced/volunteered to set up their organisation in such a way that it’s owned by the Trust or the DIF. The MNOs are hopeless when it comes to demanding these things and the DIF does not currently have a mandate to harass POs on creating DAO owned/controlled structures (especially after the result of our last proposal!), so it’s the job of the network to STOP funding POs who refuse to incorporate, issue equity and be accountable to an entity like the Trust or the DIF. If the MNOs do not learn from this then we will continue to see the same poor outcomes imo.

5/ I can personally tell you which POs I believe should be network owned, but that isn’t going to change anything. I’ve been going on about it for years now! Yet the MNOs continue to fund poor quality proposals directly, because ‘decentralisation’, even though we all know that there is absolutely no protection and there is a high likelihood that we’ll see little value returned, or as seen quite frequently, just outright scammed.
Ash and DR is a good example of what can be achieved if centralised entities with delegated authority from the DAO are asked to collaborate, but it was only possible because the condition was voluntarily put in the DR proposal and the network approved it, there was no initiative from the MNOs. What happened subsequently was a three-way discussion and review process between DR, DCG and the DIF. It was settled on that DCG would take ownership of the IP in this instance.

6/ I totally agree that there is no rush to make investment decisions. Have we given the impression that the DIF is somehow in a rush?
I think the fact that we’ve assessed over 40+ opportunities over the course of 9 months and only seen it fit to bring one to the MNOs attention is telling enough? The DIF is about quality over quantity and we are in no hurry at all to invest. I’m quite surprised that you seem to think otherwise?
Also contrast this with the - frankly appalling - track record of the MNOs in the aread of treasury funding over the years, and the strong imperative to ‘invest’ in opportunities without any due diligence or thorough consideration of the value proposition.

So in that respect, I’d argue that the DIF has shown a level of restraint that the MNOs could only dream of achieving as a collective decision making body.

Regarding IP and helping the network in decision making:

I agree that IP and asset losses have been a great drain on the network over the years, it’s one of the main reasons I volunteered to be a supervisor at the DIF, because this problem cannot be solved by decentralisation, if it could, it would have already happened. Even with the current mandate the DIF has done more than its fair share in the last 9 months by rejecting over 40+ opportunities presented to us (as investment opportunities or pre-proposals etc). I'd quite confidently state that proportion of them would have been funded by the MNOs if they went directly to the network for funding.

I'd also argue that our reserve funding proposals are already helping the network in decision making as it's creating a clear opportunity cost for the MNOs to consider. Shall we fund XYZ proposal or save the funds for another much better opportunity in the future, when the time is right.

Regards

Walter

@walters to answer your feedback which you provided Quote: "2/ The previous governance change was requested in exactly the same manner during Q1 2020. The decision of whether or not to engage an investment consultant and employ a re-balancing strategy was part of an identically structured funding proposal in January. The DIF team saw no resistance from MNOs on this type of arrangement previously. I think it would be a shame if the MNOs as a whole saw this as a breach of trust, in the same way you do."

I believe that to ensure clarity of decision making therefore should be in a separate polling request from the funding requests. This way a clear decision can be made. In this case to take on a funding manager is not that big of a deal since it does not affect the MNO rights to vote i.e. the governance system itself. However if there is major change to the DIF then perhaps consideration ought to be given to a polling vote proposal. Only for major changes however.

The decision to take on a funding manager for the DIF is very different from the decision to change our current governance voting system to remove MNO rights to either approve or disapprove investment capital. One is a change in governance the other is a change in management.

The two decisions are very different in consequences and I don't think they should be compared in my opinion.

@Walters although it is true that our current setup for decentralized decision making is not that efficient that does not mean to say that it cannot be improved to the level we need. I have many ideas on how our decentralised decision-making can be radically improved making is more efficient and with higher quality. Do you not think it is worth investigating and trying out these improvements before giving up and moving to a centralized decision making model? Perhaps consider keeping an open mind and don't give up on decentralized decision making just yet until we first implement improvements. Decentralization is what protects our network at the software level. We just need to optimize it and modify it for a social level. We have not worked on this area yet.

I will post an article on the DASH forum shortly on how decentralized decision making can be optimized and improved to move us toward giving us the results we need.

DeepBlue.

With all due respect, you continue to maintain a dangerous misconception. You have this notion that just because software or a software product exists, it somehow has value. And so you assume that if a PO is working on software product, it benefits the DAO to have equity or some kind of IP rights.

Software has value in relation to the number of users and the revenue it generates. So with that in mind, let's apply this formula to a couple of DAO funded products:

- The value of DiscoverDash is zero.
- The value of DashRetail is currently zero.

It does not benefit the DAO to have equity or IP rights in something which has no value. It makes much more sense for the DAO to fund projects to incorporate Dash into existing, successful products and services. This is why it is a shame we could not fund the ATM proposal.

DashRetail is EXTREMELY valuable to the DAO. You're deliberately ignoring their significant contributions, like their successfully released POS system with NFC cards, likely for political reasons so that you can eventually get them defunded and "replace" them with a likely less effective solution.

Its very disappointing that Dash help did not get funded this cycle, particularly since that is one of the key proposals that we MNOs rely on to represent us and our will in Venezuela. Venezuela, need I remind everyone, is the country with the most cryptocurrency adoption globally right now.

And of that adoption, the vast majority of it belongs to Dash. BTC is used for mining, but that's about it! Dash has thousands of transactions every month from, along with others, the EletroPay POS from DashBrazil sent over to Venezuela and now in use and tracking transactions for us in malls and parking lots in Venezuela. Dash retail also has a POS solution that the teams there are rapidly deploying.

I say all that to say this: Venezuela is ground zero of cryptocurrency adoption. OUR cryptocurrency adoption. We shouldn't squander this opportunity. I don't know what the DIF's future plans are, but they haven't really accomplished anything yet. That's OK, especially since it looks like we're still ironing out the details of exactly how it will function.

But DashHelp has ALREADY become a crucial part of our infrastructure growth in Venezuela, so it stands to reason that we should definitely fund them. I mean, DIF wasn't even funded this time around, yet DashHelp languished for some reason.

DashHelp has 230 NO votes! 179 of which came in the last four days with no reasoning or argumentation, which points to a political or even malicious agenda against this and/or other "third-world" proposals. We should be rubberstamping the proposals in Venezuela guys, its a no-brainer. There is literally NO EXCUSE for not funding all of them. Unless you don't want us to grow down there for some reason.

Cryptocurrencies are not intuitive, even for technical people. *Especially so* for the non-technical. So they more often than not have questions and need help. DashHelp is right there to support them, answer their calls, chat with them online, etc. No other coin has a dedicated help center, let alone one that services more than one language. It would be a terrible waste if they were to not get funding again because of something like this.

Let's figure out what the hell we want to do with the DIF, AND DO IT! So that other proposals can stop suffering and continue on with their work. It doesn't make sense to expend all this effort and mental energy on a proposal that's still getting off the ground, while we ignore proposals like DashHelp that have spent the last year facilitating adoption in our strongest growth market.

Have you posted this on the correct discussion thread? I agree that it's disappointing that Dash Help didn't get funded, but what's that got to do with the DIF?

Walter

If you read the entire comment you will clearly see that I know which proposal I'm posting on and to whom I'm speaking. My post has 2 main points in relation to this proposal:

1) DashHelp was on its way to being funded until it received 179 NO votes within the last 4 days, bringing its total No votes to 230. Of all the passing proposals, none other come anywhere near as close to the number of No votes as DashHelp. Next closest is Dach with 127. Presumably, DashHelp was aggressively downvoted to make room for DIF, with its exact 500 Dash budget ask.

2) Whatever political games are being played with DIF, its starting to spill over and hurt other proposals. Just like DashNexus doesn't get funded for strange, likely political reasons. This factioning is not beneficial to our network. Indeed, it will only grow and eventually cause a significant community split if not checked here and allowed to grow.

So its within all of our best interests to nip it in the bud right now, early, before it becomes a problem. Hence my post.

If that's the case then why was Dash Help targeted specifically? DashMall, DashNext and DashNigeria were all in the zone to be targetted by the same no votes, and a no vote on any of those three would have made way for the DIF, if the aim was to fund the DIF, which it's clear it wasn't as it didn't pass.

Sorry, i just see the link. Maybe some MNOs just don't see value in DashHelp right now for some reason? IDK. I do think it's a bit of a stretch to blame the DIF tbh.

Walter

Most likely because DashHelp was the lowest among them and easiest to take the position of. But we've seen the same MNO cabal vote NO on all the thirdworld proposals, just as you mentioned all at once. On Feb 24th that's exactly what happened. DashMall, DashNigeria, DashText, and DashHelp (but not DashBrazil, Da-ch or DashThailand) were all targetted with 124 no votes.

"if the aim was to fund the DIF, which it's clear it wasn't as it didn't pass."

That assumes that what ever political games were going on were successful. It looks like a failure on both sides. The point is, if these games weren't being played, we could've voted DashHelp in. DashHelp was going to be funded until someone with a lot of masternodes or a coordinated cabal of someone's deliberately downvoted their proposal.

There is NO WAY any MNO with their head screwed on straight could not see value in DashHelp. The only way that's possible is if you're not paying attention, which means you wouldn't vote for DIF either, so no, that can't be the reason. I'm glad you're able to give us their "perspective", no matter how irrational and unfair it may be. Hopefully the network no longer falls for these games...We are trying to work here and they are hindering our efforts.

*don't see

The initial idea with the DIF was that the network would have a legal entity that could represent it in front of proposal owners so that we could supervise that the terms of agreements made with the network could be enforced and take legal action if necessary. In order to do this we would require particularly important proposals to enter into a legal agreement with the DIF before releasing funds. This was a great idea and it has being completely forgotten by the DIF and the network.

Instead they are completely focused on trying to invest on behalf of the network when we have very low prices and it does not make much sense. To be honest I would expect the DIF to identify when is just not a good time to be making investments and just stay passive until a better time for this comes next year or when it does.

For now, I would like to see the DIF working closely with DashWatch to help represent the network's interests in front of existing proposal owners.

To the DIF, you don't need to make investments to fulfill your role, recognizing that is not a good time to make investments and waiting is also showing that you are good stewards for the network on this.


Finally, I would like to hear other MNOs operator's opinion on this as I believe many of us saw the DIF as a way to have the network be represented in front of 3rd party proposal owners.

"The initial idea with the DIF was that the network would have a legal entity that could represent it in front of proposal owners so that we could supervise that the terms of agreements made with the network could be enforced and take legal action if necessary. In order to do this we would require particularly important proposals to enter into a legal agreement with the DIF before releasing funds. This was a great idea and it has being completely forgotten by the DIF and the network."

That's simply not true in regards to the DIF. The DIF is ready and waiting for the network's instruction. It's the network that has decided not to use the DIF for this purpose yet.

"Instead they are completely focused on trying to invest on behalf of the network when we have very low prices and it does not make much sense. To be honest I would expect the DIF to identify when is just not a good time to be making investments and just stay passive until a better time for this comes next year or when it does."

"To the DIF, you don't need to make investments to fulfill your role, recognizing that is not a good time to make investments and waiting is also showing that you are good stewards for the network on this."

Quite the opposite - we've been saying 'NO' to dozens of potential proposals.. proposals that would have otherwise gone straight to the treasury system, and invariably in some cases funded. As a result we have over 3000D under DAO control which has been saved from being otherwise wasted on poor quality opportunities. We consider that a result!

We believe that it demonstrates a restraint that the MNOs could only dream of achieving as a collective decision making body. We'd also argue that this demonstrates that we've been pretty good stewards for the network since inception.

We are quite baffled as to why there is a perception that we are desperate to invest something, anything, just for the sake of it.. When the facts and figures clearly demonstrate the exact opposite is the case.

Regards

Walter

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TPewyoDtFf2LEmlvyZ8Lowu55U-P5USajGJNJNeQ5VI/edit

The DIF constitution is out of date with respect to how the DIF will handle liquid holdings. In all the meetings you have conducted, why have you neglected to amended this document that is crucial to DIF transparency?

How can we trust you to make independent decisions regarding illiquid investments when we don't even know the process by which they will be approved. This information is not in the constitution. I am assuming it is a simple majority plus Demelza plus both Directors, but that is just a wild guess on my part because we just don't know.

all of this will be uploaded to github and will be updated publicly. No one should have to look up a doc on google docs for the DIF.

I'm really on the fence about reluctantly voting yes as it does not seem like other proposals will pass. On the one hand I do think this is a step in the wrong direction, on the other I prefer that the DIF get these funds other than they be burnt. I think I will vote yes but I am hopeful we can reassess this change as the DIF matures.

I also call on DIF supervisors to stop asking for 500 Dash, as this amount should follow our distribution curve (-7%/year) to make way for other proposals.

On another note I am saddened that development proposals are not getting funded, I believe this to be because of a lack of time from some MNOs to read all proposals.

There is still plenty of time. Many MNOs wait till the last hour to vote or flip their votes. I would not base your vote upon the state of the budget cycle right now.

If the other proposals get traction I will definitely do everything I can to have those pass.

I think we have some interesting proposals this month. I'm not against the DIF in any means (though I am very much against the proposed change) but I have to wonder if pushing out other proposals that might or might not pass for a fund that already has 3146 Dash is really the direction we want to go in. Already Andy didn't post a proposal this month, and with 500 Dash locked up for months to come money that could be going to devs, business dev and more importantly innovation might instead be going to a chest of funds. I would much rather like that when a worthy proposal comes forward that we vote on that with funds attached and with the knowledge that the DIF would own a percentage of the endeavor on behalf of the network.

If we have to vote with the required funds attached that is going to seriously limit what the DIF can invest in. They need the ability to deploy the funds they already hold.

I would be happy frankly with a DashWatch poll for illiquid investments proposed by the DIF. You might say, "but there is not a lot of participation in polls." The answer to this is that MNOs that do not participate in these polls must understand that they are waiving their rights to direct DIF funds.

Ryan is going to come to the DAO for a governance proposal regarding SoV changes. By your logic, he shouldn't have to. Evan selected Ryan to run the development effort. He has the entire development team and Darren Tapp at his disposal. The MNOs are not qualified to "second guess" DCG CEO on this.

If Ryan is asking the DAO to approve SoV changes, why can't the DIF ask the DAO to approve illiquid investments?

Giving the DAO a flood of details about "thought processes" of DIF Supervisors through a Github is not going to help anything. MNOs don't have time to review all the proposals properly, and now the MNOs have got to sift through a Github? Imagine if DGC told MNOs to "look in the Github" if you want information about what we're doing.

All the DIF has to do to be more transparent in the future is to present more comprehensive proposals to the DAO with each of the supervisors and Demelza giving their comments. THAT'S IT.

And the idea that we can just "vote out" supervisors we disagree with is a non-starter because there are few qualified candidates applying for DIF supervisor.

you dont have to look on github if you dont want to, DIF can always provide video updates and interact however the MNO find best, but never the less, the data has to be publicly available and not on closed source systems and version controlled so that changes can be tracked. Thats the importance of github, version control and history.

I agree on the move to Github;
I disagree on the request for more autonomy from the supervisors (in fact I think the DIF should have less autonomy)
Since I think the DIF is already too autonomous I also would disagree on giving more funds
and finally I strongly disagree with the DIF merging those 3 requests in a single request thus not giving us the possibility to have a real say. Exactly like it happened with the DIF constitution.

Considered all those reasons I will vote no.

I watched the DIF presentation. Here is some feedback:

1. The feedback given from Mike Lewis in the video is that companies are not prepared to disclose proprietary information in an investment. However we are not asking for proprietary information. What MNOs need to know is the following:

1. How much is our investment?
2. What are we (DASH) having to commit to in the terms of the investment?
3. Check that the proposed investment fits in with our overall objective of business development of DASH and to ensure that the investment is moving forward our key target markets i.e. we maintain focus.
4. What are we getting for our investment money?

I see the role of the DIF is to ensure the above 4 points are first met as default and then doing the in-depth research to determine if it is a good investment.

The above 4 points do not have proprietary information. It has investment summary information. The details of the investment and the assessment we leave down to the DIF but we need to know the above. It was stated that the MNOs are making a investment decision on limited information. That is not quite accurate. What MNOs are doing are ensuring that the core values of DASH are being adhered to. We are enforcing transparency on the investments made and we are deciding if the investment is in line with DASH greater goals. We absolutely must have the above information as a basic requirement in my opinion in order for DASH to be protected from any form of corruption which could occur in the future. It has been shown so many times that whenever investment details are hidden there is the chance for corruption. We are building a better cash system. We need to enforce transparency from the start to prevent corruption.

DASH has to maintain its core values of transparency and decentralisation to achieve that. We would not have that however if we voted for this DIF proposal as it stands. We should not be relying on trusting DIF members. We trust the DIF to do the details of the research and to make their recommendations only. If their arguments for investing stand up to scrutiny by MNOs then the investment would more than likely go through.

There were some excellent points raised by Hytham (unchained). The documents, decisions, and digital assets need to be stored in Github so that anyone can pick up where others left off. But this is also a form of transparency. I agree 100% on this point. Once documents are in a source code management system we retain the full history and development of those documents which is essential for seeing the reasons and logic that lead to decisions being made. In my own business we have protocol documents, Graham's process charts, QA documents, scripts, programs, databases etc webpages etc - these are all valuable assets that are all stored in a source code management system. Once in an SCM system incremental improvements can be made because the documents are in a controlled environment. Storing these documents on Google drive is not a suitable alternative because it is not in a controlled environment. This should be the case with all DAO funded projects, not just the DIF. We should have a template structure for GIT hub for storing these assets so that other DAO projects can use these. Hytham also raised some points that I have been raising in my posts here. The DASH software is designed with our core values in mind. We also now need to design the social (human) part of DASH e.g. investments etc to also meet the core values of DASH. We can do this if we work on achieving this. We need to develop a social representation of our decentralized software infrastructure. In this case the "software" in the social setting, such as the DIF, are the protocols and procedures that the DIF use. I feel that a set of protocols, procedures and best working practises needs to be developed and worked on and these documents should also be stored in the Git repositories. These policy documents should also be made available to the community so that we know the mechanisms of how the DIF function. This would give more confidence in the DIF when we can see their working policies. The documents will also capture the knowledge and experience of the DIF members and will be valuable assets for future DIF supervisors to learn from.

I am confident that we will work out a solution to enable the DIF to invest in projects that have already been pre-cleared by the MNO network. However we also must have at least the 4 points on the investment above along with as much detail on the investment as possible. Until we can get the essential basics of the investment disclosed in a transparent manner I will not vote for the DIF on this proposal. Once we get these points worked out however I would definitely want to go back to supporting the DIF.

Thanks for the feedback DeepBlue.

I totally agree with you regarding the paragraph starting and ending with "There were some excellent points raised by Hytham (unchained). The documents...... .......valuable assets for future DIF supervisors to learn from."

The DIF wants to lead the way on this and show that this can be done, and done with as much openness, transparency and accountability as possible, it will take a lot of time and resources but we are confident it can be achieved.

Regarding the issue of "proprietary" information - I probably over used that word somewhat to be honest! In reality, I was talking about commercially sensitive and confidential data to a large degree. Sure, we also see proprietary data, statistics, metrics etc. However, the words commercially sensitive and confidential data are probably better terms to use in hindsight.

I note that you've highlighted 4 "need to knows" for MNOs, but the feedback we saw across all discussion channels on the BTC-Echo proposal was that much more information was required across the board. Information that we simply could not give..

For example:

The 4 "need to knows" in respect of BTC-Echo..

1. How much is our investment?

There was an NDA in place and the company did not want the deal negotiated to be made public. There are a number of commercially sensitive and legitimate reasons why companies may not want this information to be public.

2. What are we (DASH) having to commit to in the terms of the investment?

In the case of BTC-Echo this information was given in the proposal.

3. Check that the proposed investment fits in with our overall objective of business development of DASH and to ensure that the investment is moving forward our key target markets i.e. we maintain focus.

In the case of BTC-Echo this information was given. Section 3 of the proposal covers the details of how this investment would fit in with the business development objectives of DASH in Europe.

4. What are we getting for our investment money?

In the case of BTC-Echo this information was given. It was a 4.76% equity stake in the company. Also see section 4 of the proposal, it contains a full breakdown of what Dash would be getting.

Looking back, the only bit of information that was missing in the BTC-Echo proposal from the "need to knows" was the total cost of the investment?

So, when you look at it like that then I think we did as good a job as we could regarding transparency on this investment. We couldn't have provided any more.

Our concern is that by MNOs insisting on knowing the exact cost, terms and percentage on a deal we are jeopardising our negotiating position. I can assure you that we are going to miss out on the best deals if we cannot take equity stakes in projects that do not wish to announce publicly to the world how good a deal the DIF is getting...

If we insist on knowing all of this information as a minimum and having it public then a) our universe of potential investments and opportunities in private equity will shrink massively, and b) we won't be able to achieve the best negotiated prices on such investments.

Maybe that's a price the MNOs are willing to pay for total transparency?

Regards

Walter

@Walter, thanks for your reply. I am confident that we will work out a solution eventually that works for the DIF and for the DAO. I do appreciate the amount of work that DIF members have put in. I also feel somewhat sadened that a lot of the investment assessment work that your team undertook on behalf of the network was in vain on this occasion. However this is only our first go, and I'm sure the DIF and MNOs have learned valuable lessons from this experience. We all appreciate you are working hard for the network and without compensation. This is still early days and we are working out the issues one by one. The ultimate goal is to achieve transparency in investment and to have the work undertaken by the DIF to be fruitful. This is just version 1 of the Social software we talked about. By discussing these issues and working through them we will eventually develop a solution that will best fit the network needs and work for the DIF so you don't lose valuable assessment time.

We are building a new type of money system, on that will not be corruptible for the future. By ensuring we adhere to our values of transparency and decentralisation we will create that better money. If our core values are safeguarded by developing worked out policies they would also become a major selling point of DASH. Our values form our identity and what we stand for which would permeate through all aspects of our communication with the public. When others learn we have built up anti-corruption policies to safeguard investors many more investors would be attracted to DASH. They will know they can invest with us with confidence knowing we have policies in place to ensure corruption cannot occur. Our goal is ultimately to make DASH totally non corruptible, something that we cannot say about the current financial system.

Thanks for your kind words DeepBlue, it's much appreciated.

Speaking for myself now - I agree with everything you just said. The DIF is absolutely following a trajectory that upholds everything you've just said. Our request is not about removing transparency or creating some centralised black box with zero accountability, quite the opposite, in fact...

It's about aligning incentives and ensuring that there IS transparency and accountability throughout, right from the MNOs, through to Supervisors, to the Directors, and to the employees and contractors to the DIF.

The whole structure needs to work in concert and in harmony. For that to happen each stakeholder needs to understand it's roles and responsibilities within the context of the broader entity, and to be incentivised to take ownership of their role within the structure and be accountable for their part in any successes or failures.

A clearly defined hierarchy and chain of command is absolutely necessary in any organisation, even Dash Funded Organisations, and the DIF is no exception. The current arrangement - as well meaning as it is - interrupts this hierarchy and chain of command, and we believe it will have some profound and unintended consequences over time.

“Show me the incentive and I’ll show you the outcome” - Charlie Munger

Regards

Walter

q: what happened to the BTC-ECHO proposal? i ctrl-f'ed for ECHO in current and past proposals. But no results for the ctrl-f search

I am really starting to like the DIF concept. I think we should replicate it to all sorts of things. How bout this idea. What if we VOTE to elect some representatives of the Dash community to start a space exploration company. Sure, this sort of thing requires qualifications, education and experience BUT here me out.... we can VOTE for them. And. AND! If we TRUST them, it will turn out fine. Also, we could start a medical practice, maybe a law firm. So many options. Very exciting times for us.

@strophy asked a question further down in this proposal on what the solution would be for the DIF. I replied however In summary please read my suggested improvement to the DASH governance system which I posted in the DASH forum on 21st December 2019. It involves a modification to the Agile backlog system adapted for suggested DASH projects and investments.

Heading of post: Suggested Improvements to DASH Proposal and Governance System That Increase Value Of DASH

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/flexible-proposal-system.49134/

The above solution would require investment to improve our governance system however it would go quite some way to solving the problem of the DIF investing a lot of their time to investigate an investment only to have it rejected by the network. It would also maintain decentralized decision making and get MNO by-in to the possibility as a viable project to invest in before the DIF undertook a lot of investment research work and negotiation.

The other suggestion is to ensure to only consider investments with companies that are prepared to meet DASH core values of transparency and there are prepared to ensure the essential information of the proposed investment is made fully available to the network. If they are not prepared to do this then they are not a suitable partner for investment in my opinion.

3146 Dash is a lot of risk on an untested fund and adding 500 Dash to that risk this month is likely to push actual development proposals out of the pipeline (i'm delaying my own proposal for supplemental Platform development by 1 month to give those a chance).

How will we ever judge the performance of the DIF supervisors we elected if we don't let them make decisions?

Give these supervisors the power they ask for and let them sink or swim, keep in mind we elect and re-elect them. This isn't something as opaque as development progress, this is hard money increasing and decreasing with the value of what we put it in. Seeing if they are good at their job is a simple prospect.

We as a judgement body are fatally flawed in that the vast majority of us got here by dumb luck. We stumbled into a position to allocate resources and now seem to think that we are competent at it.

We appointed this team, we endow them with power through a legal framework, and we can reclaim that power come the next election, but before that election let them carry out the job we have given them.

@name3 speak for yourself. I did not "stumble" into a position of being able to allocate resource. I earned the right to have these votes. I have 29 years of business experience, so how on earth can that be classed as "stumbled". If you claim you do not have the experience to make a decision then I recommend you delegate your voting keys to me who does have that experience.

"vast majority" does not mean everyone.

Thank you for reading.

I feel we need to take a few steps back before we start saying what we should or should not do.

Firstly, we need to establish what are DASH's core values as a cryptocurrency? If we do not guard these and work with these values and make them the cornerstone on which we make decisions then we have no sense of identity. We need to more clearly establish the core values of DASH to build strengthen our identity which will help us make decisions based on those values and what we stand for. So the first question is as follows:

What are the core values of DASH?

These core values need to be identified and defined and agreed upon. Once these are agreed upon they form a set of guiding principals about what DASH is about and how we make decisions on anything. In order to build a sense of identity, linked to our values, we need to first clearly identify and decide upon, what are the core values of DASH? These core values then guide every decision we make from there onwards. Without these founding principals and values we will always have heated debates about what DASH represents or what we should do.

1. Non-Corruptable: Dash is not corruptable either now or in the future.

I feel a core value of DASH has to be to ensure that it cannot be corrupted, either now or in the future. To help protect against potential corruption Dash was born with the following characteristics:

2. Radical Transparency
This core value ensures important aspects of DASH are protected from manipulation by ensuring the workings and investments made in DASH are fully 100% transparent and can be validated to be so. We achieve this in the code by ensuring DASH is open source. Anyone can see the code being used to run DASH and therefore ensures that there are no possible back doors to the software. One of the key concepts of open source is radical transparency. With radical transparency we can ensure that all is known manipulation due to keeping facts secret cannot occur. Radical transparency needs to be a core value of DASH if we are to be sure there cannot be any corruption either now or in the future. Radical transparency is not just with the code however it needs to be a value that is carried through in all aspects of running DASH. That includes how money is spent or how it intends to be spent.

3. Decentralization, no one person or group of people could cause damage to the Dash network:

The next value I feel Dash should have is that no one individual or small group of individuals can control, manipulate or cause damage to DASH or could make decisions that could go against what the majority of shareholders wish.

We have decentralization in the code, in how the miners work and how the masternodes operate. When we are dealing with code it is easy to co-ordinate decentralization and make it efficient because the debates that occur between management are first worked out in advance before the coding occurs. These debates and decisions fit in with maintaining this core value of DASH of ensuring the infrastructure remains decentralized.

Decentralized investment decisions.
Although decisions made to determine how our core code should be developed to meet the value of decentralization it is not so easy with making financial decisions in a decentralized way. The reason is that core values are not clearly defined in this area as they are with developing the code. Therefore I feel as a start we need to clearly define the guiding principals for decentralized financial decisions in order for them to be efficient and to be good decisions.

Evan Duffield originally stated that people that have the most financial interest in DASH are the ones that are most likely to have the greatest incentive to ensure the best decisions are made for DASH. I agree with this. I agree with Evan on this point. However, if we leave just at this point we will have the problems we are having now which is a wide variety of ideas, opinions and views etc that can lead to inefficiencies in making quality decisions. The ultimate goal is to maintain decentralization, but at the same time ensuring quality decisions are made by the shareholders, in a way where it is efficient and ensures we are moving in the right direction. Currently vast amounts of time, energy, and money are being wasted because Decentralized decision making, as it currently is setup is simply not working. It was thought that setting up the DIF could resolve this issue. However in setting up the DIF the way it is now, we loose on decentralized decision making and once again would be moving towards a centralized group setup which relies on trust of the individuals. Since the DIF elections only occur once a year a lot of potential damage could happen within that time frame if the are DIF members that are not reliable or not to be capable of making the right decisions for investment. I am certainly not saying we don't trust the current DIF members. They are working as best they can and doing this of their own free time. However this does not mean we can trust the investment decisions they make are the best for the network. There is a solution for this issue however first we need to establish what are the core values of DASH to ensure that solution fits with Dash's core values.

4. Efficiency. Both investing efficiency and coding efficiency. Focus and ensure to invest in projects that have been identified as our key markets. Making the correct financial investment decisions that fit with our overall business strategy. Coding efficiency – ensure all team members are actually working together united with a clear written vision and plan.

This value of efficiency is critically important value and is currently missing from our financial decision making process in the current governance system setup. Currently whatever seemingly good idea comes forward for funding it is taken up and funded. However how does that opportunity fit into the strategic plan for DASH? By investing are we moving in the same direction in a systematic logical way? Without a focus to the financial decision making process DASH will always be wasting time, money and resources as we have seen so many times with seemingly "good ideas" for project with no substance behind them. Focus in investment is critically important for the DASH project to be successful. That means saying NO to anything that does not fit with our overall business strategy. An analogy might be drawn from building a clothing wardrobe a pair of shoes, bag or tie might be a great item on its own but without it fitting in with the existing wardrobe it will not be worn. The wardrobe should also match owner's values. Investing in random projects that do not fit with a strategic plan for investing is like choosing random clothes items that don't fit with the existing wardrobe.

5. Trustlessness. This means that we ideally would have a setup where we do not need to trust any one person or individual to ensure the best decisions are being made by the network. This has been achieved to some degree in the code of how DASH operated however we have not yet achieved this in making Governance and investment decisions

6. Focus on payment solutions and making DASH accessible for anyone to use.

There are other core values of DASH but there is limited space here to discuss them. In summary these are the values I feel we must consider with any decisions we make with DASH

DASH core values:
1. Non corruptible (both now and for the future),
2. Radical transparency (in code and investment),
3. Decentralisation (not possible to exploit Dash by minority group of individuals),
4. Efficiency (both Investment and Coding efficiency)
5. Trustlessness (quality decisions can be made without the need to trust any one individual or group.
6. Payment solution - make tech usable by anyone.

I have much more to say on this subject however I feel we need to keep these values foremost in our minds when making decisions about DASH. If we do not cherish these values. then we may as well just become like a centralized crypto bank.

Trustlessness is one of the most significant ones. When supporters of the DIF explain how magically great the DIF is they ALWAYS use the word "trust".

If we then consider the above values to be the DASH core values. Then using these to make a decision on what type of investment to make. We would come to these conclusions:

1. Any potential investor that is not prepared to meet the Dash Core values of Radical transparency i.e. full disclosure of the all the financial details of the investment should not be consider as a potential investment partner. The reaon is the network will not be in full receipt of the details and we would have to rely on Trust of the investment partners to be making the right decision. Since Decentralization and Trustlessness are also key values of DASH we cannot therefore accept any investment partner that requires and NDA on the specific details of the actual financial investment.

If we take the example of the first proposed investment by the DIF we would not be able to consider that investment as a potential investment for DASH because it would cause us to go against 3 of our core values.

This would make investment choices much easier for the Network because now we simply say "no" to any potential investor that want to keep secret the actual investment details to the network.

If we consider the DACH blog site investment as an example this would eliminate that investment from the start and we could confidently say "no" to that investment.

We would wait until a suitable investment was presented where the details of the investment could be made fully available to the network. One would eventually come along.

Warren Buffet famously said he can have hundreds of investments thrown at him and he will only consider the ones that meet all his criteria. There should be NO RUSH to choose an investment i.e. we must have patience. We wait until the right investment partner, that meet our requirements and values, comes along.

I recommend you watch Warren Buffet see the video interview below where Warren explains this concept. Buffett says wait for as long as is necessary until the exact right pitch arrives. He actually says he waits for thousands of pitches before he sees one he likes.

Warren Buffett's Advice on Investing - "Wait for the Right Pitch"

https://youtu.be/XF8qdFyS-t4?t=106

It does not matter how apparently good the investment appears to be. If it does not meet our core values the investment should not be considered.

It does not matter how good an opportunity the pitch is. There will always be another, better pitch.

It is better not to invest than to waste money on a bad investment.

By insisting all details of the investment are made available we eliminate investments that could cause us to go against our core values as a crytpocurrency.

We are not here to make money on investments - for that you should go and invest with the traditional corrupt finance industry. We are here to make the right investments that meet with our core values of trully sound money. That can only be done with radical transparency. Yes, our aim is also to make revenue but not at the cost of breaking our core values. That is what makes us different from traditional finance and banking system. We are aiming to be better than that.

Therefore we should keep waiting until the right pitch comes along that meets our core values. Then we know we have at least an investment partner that gets where we are coming from. That however is only the first stage. We would then have to consider if the investment is a good investment and if it assists us meet our other core values. e.g. point 4 above - does it address our target market? Does it meet with our overall strategy for promoting DASH into our target markets ?

The issues of Efficiency needs to be addressed in investing in a decentralized manner. There is a solution for this however I would be interested to hear other's views on the core values of DASH. Do you agree / disagree with the Dash values posted above?

I decided to vote NO on the funding part of this proposal, as i think the amount per month (500 Dash) is too high, particularly taking into account the 7,1% block reward reduction that will take place within this month.

We are dealing with the Dunning–Kruger effect here. The DIF supervisors are still WAY TOO CONFIDENT in their abilities. It does not matter that we elected them.

The DAO needs to maintain veto power over illiquid investments.

What makes you believe the DAO is competent enough to handle these decisions better than the DIF supervisors will?

@name3 you do also realise this is a poling vote? If you are voting yes your are voting to take away MNOs right to approve / not approve an investment by the DIF? You are aware of that?

1. Dash values are:
1. Non corruptible (both now and for the future),
2. Radical transparency (in code and investment),
3. Decentralisation (not possible to exploit Dash by minority group of individuals),
4. Efficiency (both Investment and Coding efficiency)
5. Trustlessness (quality decisions can be made without the need to trust any one individual or group.
6. Payment solution - make tech usable by anyone.

If we leave the DIF to have 100% control on what they invest we are going against many of DASH's core values. We would be making investment decisions up to a centralized body (breaks value 3 above) we will not have a trustless decision making system (breaks value 5) we will not have "Radical transparency" (break Value 2) and Value 1 could be broken in the future because these other values were broken.

We need neet a solution where the DIF can operate but we still maintain all our core values as a cryptocurrency. We cannot change the DASH core values - otherwise we may as well just become like the normal centralized financial system which has proven time and again to be corrupted - remember 2008 financial crisis?

The DIF first investment proposition was not voted through because it was a really bad idea. They wanted to invest in a crypto blog website in our non target market. Does that make sense to you?

What would you rather we spend our money on - our target market or our non target market?

Can MNOs PLEASE take a few minutes to watch this interview segment with Andreas Antonoplous. He explains what our traget market is exactly. And we absolutely must understand this to make the right investment decisions.

https://youtu.be/MfNzjkFb58s?t=110

Our target market are for people that do not have access to stable financial systems, countries with Dictatorships, Countries with distressed currencies - this accounts for 6 billion people We have to focus on these markets.

If we had given the DIF 100% investment decisions as you are now voting for then they would have voted in that investment. By giving MNOs the opportunity to argue against bad investments like this we protect our investment revenue and at the same time help the DIF learn what are the good investments. If the DIF really do have a good investment then the MNOs would support it because the DIF would be able to give reasonably convincing arguments. They did not manage to do this on their first investment opportunity and thank God we had the chance to block that.

If you vote yes on this proposal you would be going against DASH's core values and you would be taking away MNOs rights to decide if the DIF can make an investment or not.

For these reasons we have to vote no on this proposal if we are to retain MNO rights to have the last say yes or no to an investment decision by the DIF.

The BTC-Echo proposal was a request to investigate further, NOT a go ahead. I would not have voted to move forward after the collapse in oil. That was the main reason, i pushed for the transparency. DIF supervisors can move alot faster than a network wide decision. A MNO vote can never anticipate fluid business decisions. The market doesnt stand still for 3-4 weeks while we vote.

Listen you can type out your long paragraphs about the values of Dash and Core values and all that. But that isn't what is up for a vote.

The questions here are two fold:

Do I want to give the DIF 500 Dash a month for the next three months?

Yes, I do.

Do I think the DIF should be empowered to make decisions based on their understanding of that facts?

Yes, I do.

If I don't like the job that the DIF supervisors do Ill vote them out of their roles when the time comes, but I see no reason for the masternodes to weigh in on the decisions that we supposedly empowered this group to make.

@name3 I have to disagree again with your point of view. Our core values are up for vote. By voting for this proposal I've already explained previously that our core values will be compromised.

I want us to implement a solution where we strengthen our core values as I've describe in my posts here but still are able to get DIF support in making decisions. So far nobody is considering this possibility. It is only being put forward we should "trust" the DIF.

"If we had given the DIF 100% investment decisions as you are now voting for then they would have voted in that investment. "

That's not factually correct. You like to oversimplify things that are actually quite complex. Supervisors voted to put the decision to the network, the network said no. If the network voted yes there was still a LONG way to go before any deal was done. There are many variables at play, both internal to to the DIF and external, you only have to look at the rapid deterioration in the world economy since that proposal went up, for example.

Please don't make assumptions about what the DIF would or would not have done. You have no idea.

Regards

Walter

@Walter I quote exactly what is written in your proposal description

"request a change to the current agreement that we submit decision proposals to the MNOs for approval on any investments, the requested change is to remove this requirement going forwards."

"To remove this requirement going forward" that phrase sounds pretty clear to me. i.e. MNOs have no say in approving your investment decisions.

You also provide no information to state otherwise in your proposal description. You simply state above " I have no idea" and "it is LONG way to go before a deal is done."

If I have no idea as you state then can you state specifically when do MNOs have a say in your investment decisions?

If a contract is signed with an investor then could you explain how MNOs can change what you've agreed in a contract on behalf of the network?

I’m stating that you have no idea how the DIF would progress with an investment, whether MNO approval was requested/needed/granted or not.

You were stating (if I’ve read correctly) that without MNO veto power the DIF would have gone ahead and invested in BTC Echo, for example.

I’m correcting that assumption.

Just because the MNOs give permission to make an investment deal doesn’t mean it will happen...

It’s just one hurdle in a lengthy process, in which there’s no point going down if MNOs reject the idea in principle, which is what happened in the case of btc-echo.

Walter

I agree we should get rid of the DAO and move to a foundation like all the other bigger marketcap cryptocurrencies.

No one is suggesting to get rid of the DAO, so don't characterize it that way. The DIF is *one* sub organization out of many in our DAO, and it will remain that way regardless of what is decided here.

I would like to see those casting "no" votes here describe how they see the alternative playing out given the known constraints on releasing information.

If we do not trust the DIF supervisors to perform the job they were elected to do, that does not magically change the security, legal or commercial constraints that we face as a DAO. We would still face limited information each time we are asked to decide on an investment. I believe this would result in further hung decisions made by voting according to the current 10% net threshold, making it almost impossible for the DIF to invest in anything (other than its hedging mechanism, when the administrative issues there are finally resolved). As a result, a "no" vote now is a vote to cripple the DIF while we go through further decision proposals to finally resolve how we want to make decisions on external investments. These can only be done with a monthly cadence, resulting in further delays at a time when investment capital is in high demand and share prices are discounted due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and while the DIF has cash on hand.

My vote for now is not to put more burden on the MNOs, who have already proven they do not read proposals in their entirety, and who have proven considerable apathy through the vote count compared to the masternode count. For this reason I will vote yes here, since I believe the supervisors are in a better position than us MNOs to decide on investments, given they have access to the confidential information required to make a decision. It is a better use of our time to vote on the individual supervisors' performance in a yearly cadence than attempt to assess investment proposals on a monthly cadence without knowledge of e.g. how much the investment will even cost.

@strophy you asked about how the DIF could work. Firstly the details of any investment should be made 100% transparent. If a company we wish to invest to is not prepared to make that information public then simply we do not invest in that company. Some of Dash's core values are

DASH core values:
1. Non corruptible (both now and for the future),
2. Radical transparency (in code and investment),
3. Decentralisation (not possible to exploit Dash by minority group of individuals),
4. Efficiency (both Investment and Coding efficiency)
5. Trustlessness (quality decisions can be made without the need to trust any one individual or group.
6. Payment solution - make tech usable by anyone.

Any investment decision should meet our core values if we are to have any form of integrity as a crypto coin. There are plenty of companies wanting investment. We just need patience to find one that is prepared to ensure the terms of the deal are made available to the network.

To provide one answer to your question on how would it work with the DIF? On the 21st December 2019 I proposed a change to the Governance system which would ensure to obtain MNO buy-in of a proposed investment before it went to the MNO governance vote. Please visit the following URL and read my post with the heading. Therefore proposed investments would be fed into this system and MNOs would do a pre-vote to show their willingness to fund a project. If that pre-vote showed it was in favour then the DIF could undertake the in-depth assessment of the proposal. In this way the DIF will not lose their valuable time working on a proposed investment until there is pre-approval from MNOs and the proposed investment is better than investments in our own product. I feel we should invest in our own product first before investing in 3rd party products since we have much more control and direct benefit.

Here is my posting in the Dash Forum on one possible solution to the problem you raise:

"Suggested Improvements to DASH Proposal and Governance System That Increase Value Of DASH"

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/flexible-proposal-system.49134/

For me the the DIF supervisors were not elected to make these decisions on behalf of the network. I trust them to perform their job, but this was not in there original job description and I am very weary of increasing that job. I also believe that the supervisors are in a better position than MNOs to decide on investments, and that is factored in my decisions and I'm sure it is for many other MNOs. I think the issue is that we have a sample size of 1 turned down proposal. We have seen many proposals pass over the years, why not the DIF supported one last month? Is it because the system is broken or that it wasn't well liked? I think a few more need to be presented before a conclusion can be properly made.

simple. Projects gets funded through the DAO and contract with the DIF.
But fuck it, let's get rid of the DAO completely. When we have these trusted people to do all the work for us. I mean... what's the point. I think maybe we can move forward my streamlining and only having one representative making the decisions. That would be the most efficient still.

Just because we elect someone to be DIF supervisor, that does not magically make them competent to be DIF supervisor.

The DIF's Investment Manager should oversee the liquid investments and the DAO should have veto power over any illiquid investments. What is so terrible about this arrangement?

My understanding was that this is exactly why we had an election instead of having a group of insiders select each other. By voting in the supervisors, we were given the opportunity to see their real names, qualifications and criminal history, so presumably we did select the most competent supervisors. That you are retroactively questioning this process makes me think you are unhappy with the result, but such is the nature of democracy. The majority decides, we give them a year to do their job, and then we vote again.

In answer to your question about why giving the DAO veto power over investments is that it gives decision-making power to a group of decision-makers with only partial information. The information cannot be released in full for reasons described above. Making decisions based on partial information, when full information is available, is stupid. That is what is terrible with that arrangement.

Full information? Everyone is always operating on partial information. Even those who've signed the NDA are not omniscient. My advice is to stay the course and not give the supervisors any more power. The BTC-Echo failure was probably just bad timing. The DAO is not that hard to convince. DashTaxi got funded.

Still think this is important to fund, but wonder why the DIF didn't take the same steps as DCG in seeking funding and adjust their ask for the upcoming block reward reduction. Voting yes for now, but would like the DIF to resubmit with a 9% ask next cycle.

And for the record, I have no problem with the changes to the DIF in this proposal, I think it is a step that should've been taken sooner, as the DAO grows, we have to delegate some decisions or be overwhelmed with voting duties.

In principle i don't have a problem with it either, i just thought the DIF would first poll the network a few times before going that direction.

Currently i have more a problem with the requested amount for funding.

I have a problem with the funding part as well, but will vote yes so the governance vote is recorded, I want the DIF to come back with a 9% ask next cycle.

Please submit a new proposal. Let's get rid of the DAO completely. This trusted set up is obviously much preferable because we have the "experts". Let's be more like Litecoin!

I always wanted the DIF to represent a necessary gateway between traditional investment and Dash. For example a company wants funding to do something: well the DIF would get a percentage of shares for its capital. And then when that company does well the DIF can sell those shares and return the investment with all the appreciation to the network.

The premise was never to stop asking the network for its consent to funding and its hard for me to get behind such a change. If the rules for voting were changed (ie a simple majority is needed as long as the proposal is up for 15 days), I could potentially get behind that. I understand the frustration that DIF supervisors are currently having, and I have high respect for those supervisors as well. I also really like some things that would be done around ensuring transparency and accountability after this requested change.

Unless I'm mistaken there had only been 1 DIF proposal so far that didn't pass, and I feel like many of the assumptions that nothing could pass might be quite premature, if 4 or 5 were given to the network and nothing passed that might signal something, but I do believe not enough proposals have gone out to draw definite conclusions that the system is broken.

'The premise was never to stop asking the network for its consent to funding and its hard for me to get behind such a change.'

I thought the premise was that the DIF would seek masternode approval for their first few investment opportunities, so the DIF could get a feeling on how the network felt about these type of investment opportunities.

After awhile the DIF would start making independent choices with regards to investment opportunities, no longer needing to consult the masternode network.

I am surprised though that the DIF wants to stop polling the network after just one polling of the network.

Funding rounds for good projects will not wait for DAO approval, we would potentially miss alot of deals. Good projects dont need DAO funding, they can get it from plenty of other investors. If we get hamstrung the DIF will find it difficult to actually invest in anything. Supervisors can and should be changed, based on performance and/or contributions which will be visible online. I would like to foster an open source ethos to the project, anyone can see and if they want contribute to make the DIF more anti-fragile.

I support additional funding, but am on the fence regarding this request to remove decision-making ability from the masternode network. Abstaining for now, pending further discussion.

Since their original formation the DIF went from being self described as "with a governance vote/poll to determine whether you’d like us to use your saved funds to pursue said opportunities." to [paraphrasing] its our money and you don't have a say with what we do with it, besides to vote for your betters.

This doesn't seem like a perversion of the original mission? A degradation of the DAO itself? This is terrible.

Vote No. Nothing the DIF claims or is capable of bringing to the Dash network is worth having a trusted, political, and arrogant organization of insiders to dirty Dash's reputation as a decentralized cryptocurrency. This makes the dash community feel smaller. It makes it less trusted by virtue of forcing us to trust how DAO funds will be spent. This is basically exactly what trolls and dash haters warned us would happen. siphoning off power to fewer and fewer people. For what benefit? The only benefit that the DIF really brings to the table is to make contracts with proposal owners. Everything else is unnecessary.
Anyone voting for this is an impatient asshole. You are willing to kill this DAO experiment for what you perceive to be the easy path. Shameful.

A vote for the DIF is a vote against the DAO.

This argument commits the logical fallacy of appealing to extremes and applies a ton of loaded language, I don't think comments like this are conducive to making reasoned decisions. How can a group of people selected by a verifiably fair election be an "arrogant organization of insiders" bent on dirtying our reputation? They would be voted out within a year. Please detail the mechanism by which they are personally benefiting from these activities, rather than the network as whole.

Similarly, the DIF was formed as the result of a vote. The majority of the network voted to create it with a mandate of doing more than just making contracts with DAO contractors. While you might disagree with the decision to form the DIF, it was formed with this mandate as the result of a verifiably fair election, and calling it a way to "siphon off power" is simply not accurate, regardless of your personal feelings. It already exists and it already has a mandate to invest, so voting down a proposal discussing how to make decisions based on the reasoning that that mandate can somehow be retroactively undone by withholding funding seems a little late to the game and just another way of shooting ourselves in the foot.

And above all, I have yet to see a reasoned solution to what will happen in the future if we do vote no here. What is the alternative? As far as I can see the alternative is to continue allowing MNOs to make the decisions based on partial information. This amounts to knowingly lobotomising our decision-making process, we are forcing ourselves to decide on an investment without knowing the investment amount, for example. Why? Why did we **elect** representatives, supposedly from among the best of us, only to turn around and cripple their ability to act?

I forgot how effective voting for representatives is. Thank you for reminding me. I always thought to myself, you know what dash is missing? Politics.

Awful.

Unfortunately this budget proposal has transformed from being just a budget proposal seeking funding, to being both a budget proposal and a polling proposal seeking approval for the included 'Material change request'.

This is awkward to say the least.

Agreed. This would have done well to have two separate votes. I support additional funding, but am on the fence on removing voting power from the masternode network.

I will have to regrettably remove my support as well. We can't have amateur supervisors making illiquid investments without DAO approval.

The supervisors have made so many mistakes to date, I'm shocked that they would ask for this. Let's go over the mistakes the supervisors have made...

1. First they ignore Ryan's original directive to hire an investment manager. They create a stupid website and plan a PR blitz instead.

2. They realize they don't have the credentials to make any investments at all, and so they hastily construct a poll with a "preferred option" so the DAO can rubber stamp it.

3. They misinterpret the poll results ("Majority, plurality, what's the difference!") and decide to keep everything in Dash.

MNOs should vote NO on this proposal if you want to retain your rights to voting if the DIF can invest on a project or not.

Fellow MNOs if you vote for this proposal you remove you rights, as a MNO, to vote if the DIF can invest in a DIF investment project or not. We had originally agreed with the DIF we would retain our rights to approve / disapprove any DIF investment before it could go ahead. This proposal, if voted through, would fundamentally change the Governance system and the MNOs voting right to say if a project is worth investing in or not. Removing spending our funds from a decentralized decision making process to a centralized decision making process. We all know the consequences and damage that can be caused by centralization.

I also wish to highlight the apparent underhand way this major change in the DIF rights has been presented in this proposal.

The most important change to this proposal can only be seen by clicking on the "SHOW FULL DESCRIPTION" button - which means MNOs, you will not see this major change if you do not click on that button. In addition, there is no mention of this radical change in the title of this proposal the DIF used the title of this proposal "DIF-FUNDING-PROPOSAL-APR-JUN-3MONTHS“" Using a title like this means that MNOs that don't take the time to properly read the proposal could just automatically vote thinking it is a vote for DIF funding and not a vote to take away our rights to vote on whether the DIF can invest in a project or not

Here is the clause all MNOs need to be aware of that has been placed below the "show full description button"

"IMPORTANT: Material change request
After much internal discussion between the DIF supervisors we believe it’s in the DIF and the Dash network’s best interests to request a change to the current agreement that we submit decision proposals to the MNOs for approval on any investments, the requested change is to remove this requirement going forwards. "

In other words if you vote yes for this proposal you take away your rights to decide if the DIF can invest on a project or not.

I am finding it quite hard to believe that the DIF have presented this major change to the governance system in this way. I find it both unprofessional and Machiavellian to hide this critically important decision in this manner.

The DIF have changed track after they have securing MNO confidence in previous DIF funding proposals. They had previously gained our confidence by specifically assuring us that they *would not* move forward on any investment without first getting the approving 10% clearance votes from the MNOs in a voting proposal. They got our past votes based on that assurance. Now they are attempting to change that fundamental right for MNOs to have the right to say yes or no to a DIF funding project.

The decision vote for removing MNO rights to vote on DIF investments should have been in a separate voting proposal and not mixed in with a funding request. By mixing it up with a funding request like this it draws attention away from it and it can be hidden by not announcing it in the title of this proposal and hiding it below the "Show full Description" button.

I have highlighted in detail in their previous decision proposal why their investing in a virtually unknown crypto blog site for the DACH region, that does not address our target market was overall a bad idea for DASH. I laid out logical reasons for this however the DIF where not able to give reasonable arguments to address my concerns. Luckily MNOs had the right to stop the DIF investing in such a project. However with this proposed change we would not have been able to stop that investment and, not only this, we would have had to continue to honour that investment whatever the conditions may have been e.g. If we did not have sufficient funds we would have had to continue to pay up month after month if the funds were insufficient. We simply do not know because we would have had to sign an NDA just to see the terms and then we could not discuss those terms with other MNOs. If we do not know what we would be voting for we could bring significant damage to DASH.

I also see a serious potential security risk to this DIF autonomy to invest how they see fit without an MNO approval vote. If later down the line there could be a majority of DIF members voted in that may not be trustworthy, for whatever reason, an attack could be made on the DASH Network by committing DASH to an investment that could bring the network down financially. This type of attack could only be prevented by decentralised decision making like we have now.

We certainly have had unscrupulous MNOs, most likely owned by competing coins, in the past voting against known good proposals. Imagine if the same characters could gain our confidence and get into the DIF - they could potentially bring DASH down with purposefully bad investment decisions.

The fundamental principals of DASH is to be decentralized. Our only protection is to maintain decentralisation on the decision making when it comes to funds. That must remain in place under all circumstances.

Let me repeat: MNOs should vote NO on this proposal if you want to retain your rights to vote if the DIF can invest on a project or not.

I don't think there is any ill intent here as you seem to portray. I feel the supervisors just want the best for the network and they are asking us to trust them. I personally trust the individual members but I'm not sure I want the system to change so dramatically, as I haven't seen that the system is inherently broken. 5 years from now different dif supervisors might be elected with a different set of values and I might not want those supervisors to have the control that this proposal is asking for. On another level, if strategic investments don't pan out that the network voted for that's the networks fault, which I like, pushing so much responsibility on DIF supervisors could lead to the network blaming them if some investments go sour.

Are you suggesting that MNOs don't read proposals properly?

let's get rid of MNOs

"MNOs should vote NO on this proposal if you want to retain your rights to voting if the DIF can invest on a project or not."

I agree. That is exactly what MNOs should do if they do not wish to change the status quo.

I think Yes :)
If the MNOs do not read proposals properly and many are not even aware that this change is included because they didn't read past the title, are these the people we want to rely on to evaluate prospective investments? Or should we be relying on our elected supervisors who have access to more information about the investments than most MNOs and who are specifically tasked with doing due diligence?

I am saying the current title for this proposal is not fully descriptive on what MNOs are actually voting on and b) the suggested changes to remove MNO voting rights are only visible if an MNO clicks the SHOW FULL DESCRIPTION button. If they do not click that button and read all the text they will miss your proposed removal of MNO voting rights.

To get a clear decision being made on MNO voting rights on DIF projects a separate decision proposal needs to have been raised that says the following:

Title: "Decision: Remove MNO rights to vote whether the DIF can invest in a project"

Description:

"Vote YES to remove MNO rights to vote on a DIF proposed investment and give the DIF complete autonomy on what they want to invest in"

Vote NO for MNOs wish to retain their right to vote whether the DIF can make an investment or not"


In addition there may also be a % of MNOs that wish to keep their voting rights to deciding if the DIF can invest on a proposal but they still may wish to assign the DIF funds. By combining the two decisions together, like you have done here, the DIF do not give these MNOs the opportunity to vote exclusively on the proposed change in policy. The DIF are obliging MNOs that may wish to support funding of the DIF to give up their rights to vote to provide funds to the DIF.

"If they do not click that button and read all the text they will miss your proposed removal of MNO voting rights."

What you mean is that if an MNO doesn't read the proposal, then they'll miss the part of the proposal titled "IMPORTANT: Material change request" which is clearly emphasised in BOLD and is also underlined, for good measure. It's hardly "unprofessional" or "Machiavellian", and it most certainly is not "hidden". Certain text is deliberately emphasised to highlight the importance of what is being asked. I don't think it could be made any clearer?

Your argument seems to be that MNOs don't read proposals before voting on them, and that the DIF Supervisors are somehow deceiving MNOs who do not read proposals properly?

Either way, I think you're being grossly unfair in your scathing criticism of the DIFs professionalism & integrity.

This is a concise, easily readable and clear proposal. MNOs are more than capable of reading this and making an informed voting decision... Moreover, if you think us MNOs aren't capable of reading/understanding this proposal, then why the hell do you conversely think we can make better investment decisions than the people we put in place to run the DIF? I say that as a fellow MNO.

I can assure you that the whole DIF team are working very hard on this project, with honesty and integrity at the core of everything we do, we are all passionate about helping Dash succeed, we wouldn't be putting in so many hours of our personal time for free otherwise.

Also that button doesn't appear on Dash Nexus. If we want a better site to discuss these proposals that does not truncate the proposal text, why not use the one we already paid for?