Welcome!

Ugh, just vote one DIF tranche in, if another PO passes it, so be it, but stop burning Dash, it affects our tokenomics.

I believe this proposal can fund if votes are switched.

I know that if the proposal funds DASH will go directly to the DIF's Trezor.

The DIF does not currently have a coherent strategy.

I am drafting strategies for the DIF, these strategies assume we're working with $200k to $800k for the year. Your vote on this proposal guides which end of the spectrum you would like the DIF to prepare for.

Note: I have a strategy for a full year of operations even without DAO support.

"I believe this proposal can fund if votes are switched."

I am not going to argue with a Ph.D. in mathematics on this one. :)

The miraculous thing about the DIF is that it can legally hold assets on behalf of the DAO. Remember, the DAO does not exist legally. We need to fund the DIF so it can fulfill its mission.

Also, the DIF is under legal agreement to receive equity in our new partner, ReadyRaider. This advances an exclusively dash accepting business and the DAO can share in the success of ReadyRaider. Exciting times ahead.

Also, the DIF is in general agreement that we should avoid running masternodes.

I expect we will be guided by this when we review operations and balancing strategy.

This proposal has sparked some great discussion!

Please note that there is a thread on the fourm:

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/hello-im-darren-tapp-from-a-dif-trust-protector.50507/

Which I hope will be a more central discussion point. Also, discussion will persist longer than just one proposal.

Have not had enough time to respond to Darren Tapp's Forum threads, but he has raised some interesting propositions. I f it comes down to burning Dash or funding the DIF, I'll choose funding. even for Tranche # 2.

That's great to hear agnewpickens! We've had a few meetings and are ramping up to meeting (at least) weekly.

Right now, we're defining the DIF scope and working out a restructuring.

Darren's thread is here BTW:

https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/hello-im-darren-tapp-from-a-dif-trust-protector.50507/

Thanks!

How much do you pay Hays for consulting? Do you use a quantum system for your assets ?

I had high hopes for this, but disappointed in the direction/disorganization of the DIF.

I was excited about Ryan Taylor's initial proposition for the purpose of the DIF: It would be a way for the network to "invest" in, and to benefit from, the success of funded *proposals*.

Instead, it seems to have turned into a "VC fund" that's trying to *pick its own investments*. And it's expensive to hire VC investment managers (especially good ones).

Why not just have supervisors act as escrow agents and manage the ownership of entities that get funded?

The proposers come to the network to ask for funding (similar to the past), but proposers must agree to have funds released to the DIF as well as give the network stake in their "company." The DIF acts as escrow agent and releases funds to them contingent on signing the agreed percent of "ownership shares" to the DIF, and upon success/completion of the agreed work/milestones.

That was my understanding beforehand too - though I do think it makes sense for the DIF to build up funds to award with DAO approval, otherwise asks would be limited to what the DAO can afford at the time and could either result in the inability to move on an opportunity or be forced to disrupt the entire cycle.

The DIF was NEVER intended to be some kind of drop-box for equity from for-profit companies funded by proposal. There has never been a profitable service or product funded by proposal. DashRetail is the latest example of the DAOs poor judgement with regard to funding for-profit enterprises via proposal.

The DIF is a way for the DAO to set aside and grow funds so they can be deployed BY THE DIF for the benefit of the DAO when an opportunity arises.

> The DIF was NEVER intended to be some kind of drop-box for equity from for-profit companies funded by proposal.

What.....? One of the initial reasons that Ryan Taylor proposed the DIF was for this *exact* purpose. He has said the network has been funding "for-profit" companies and not getting anything in return, AND the DIF can be used to remedy this by doing *exactly* that.

Granted, he also said the DIF can be used for *any* purpose because the network can vote in any supervisors that decide to take it in any possible direction. But to say it was "NEVER" intended for that purpose is like saying Bitcoin was "NEVER" intended to be digital cash, because it was explicitly stated so at its creation.

> The DIF is a way for the DAO to set aside and grow funds

You say that as if that is the one true purpose, when it is just one of many *options* to consider.

Yes, it *can* be a way to do that, IF "the network" (or supervisors) decide to use it that way. I can see that that is what *you* wish for it, but just because you wish it so, doesn't mean the whole network does. It's up to the network (and supervisors) to take it in the direction that we want it to go.

Here is Ryan Taylor saying that, in his own words:

https://youtu.be/1F9oXntVfNc?t=3195
But often times we're dealing with startups that have no customer base. No guarantee that that funding is going to result in anything of value to the DASH network. In situations like that, in which there's really high risk, it doesn't make sense to give someone a grant. But it may make sense if there is some recognition for that risk. And how that typically works, in the world of venture capital, is equity shares. Well, how is it that the network own equity shares? That's a really difficult problem to solve. We did it through a legal structure.

https://youtu.be/1F9oXntVfNc?t=3332
And so it is a memberless, ownerless, investment fund, that can make investments on behalf of the DAO, or can take ownership of a proposal owner's equity, if a proposal is funded. And so it can accumulate assets that are there to benefit the network.

https://youtu.be/1F9oXntVfNc?t=3403
The DIF can enter into a contract with a proposal owner that says if your proposal for 100 DASH is funded in the month of July, you will issue 10% of the shares in your company to the DIF. And that contract can be shared with the masternode owners as part of their proposal.

I'm saying the most rational thing to do is allow the DIF to amass funds and then use those funds with the approval of the DAO. We had the funds this cycle and yet this proposal did not pass.

And if the DIF is used as you suggest, where the project is funded by proposal, the PO would have to contract with the DIF BEFOREHAND for it to make any sense whatsoever and then hope there is money in the budget.

We elect the DIF supervisors, and as long as the supervisors commit to asking for the DAO's approval via proposal for any illiquid investments made on behalf of the DAO...

YOU SHOULD HAVE NO REASON NOT TO FUND THE DIF BECAUSE THESE FUNDS WILL STILL BELONG TO THE DAO.

I did not get an answer to my question below. When a proposal owners does not answer default vote = no. If they do not respond quickly to information requests default vote = no. If they give a poor answer default vote = no.

If a proposal owner can't be bothered, neither can I.

It saddens me that your question was not promptly answered. I believe the document you are requesting can be found here:

https://github.com/DashInvests/dif-communication/blob/master/June_Fund_Fact_Sheet_2020.pdf

If you would like to have a more in depth conversation, please email me: darren.tapp AT dashinvests.org

I was recently elected as a DIF supervisor. I'm available for a call/video call with you next week, just send an email.

With all due respect DeepBlue, the DIF is not just a proposal owner. The DIF is more than that, and it's going through a bit of turmoil right now. Would you please get off your high horse and stop ordering people about. It's important that the DIF succeeds. What's not important is your ego.

I did not get an answer on the last proposal from the DIF. Is there a maximum amount of reserves the DIF seek to acquire?

To my knowledge based on all meetings I have attended, there is no maximum goal of reserves.

The new supervisors should be replacing the old at the end of this month, however. This means things could change.

I hope to see leadership from someone at the DIF this next year, though I don't know how. That is why I did not re-run for supervisor: it is not at all clear to me how the DIF can get itself organized into a proper, professional hierarchical strcture.

I am unable to read one of your documents. Here are the details on which one.

On your first link above to a PDF on Github called "June_Fund_Fact_Sheet_2020.pdf there is reference to another document inside it on page 5 , point 3 with the intro text given below. This text is followed by a non-clickable link that also cannot be copied and therefore I am unable to review the document with the link that does not work.

Text to search for in the PDF is:

"For further information in regards to financial products based on cryptocurrencies please take a look at 3.3.3 and 4.2.6 of this document " <link is here, but it is not clickable and also cannot be copied>

In light of the low candidate participation and voter turnout for the DIF election, I am not in favor of allocating funds to the DIF right now.

I am going to upvote both DIF tranches, but I would like to express my displeasure with the DIF's decision to stake Dash via Bitcoin Suisse. These Dash are used to fund masternodes, and so the income they generate is at the expense of legitimate masternode owners who have their own funds at risk. The DIF is in effect LEECHING off the DAO instead of investing the funds or lending them at interest.

I would like to see the DIF constitution amended to prohibit the staking of Dash with services that use them to run masternodes.

I agree with this and have always agreed with this: the DIF ought not be decreasing the frequency of payouts to Dash's investors.

I was obviously in the minority, however, when this vote was taken.

The argument of the majority has some merit, though, in that they claimed that custodial services aren't free, so staking the reserves is just a clean way to pay for its custody (though at this point, I'm betting the staking rewards outweigh the custodial fees?)

But in my view (which again was a minority view), the DIF ought to keep custody of its own crypto. Surely a main feature of crypto is the ability to be your own bank! If the world's first DAO-funded investment firm can't hold their own crypto, then who can?

But, again, the majority made another understandable point when they claimed that it felt like far too much liability to be keyholders of the DIF's entire reserve balance themselves, and they also didn't feel comfortable leaving it all on the directors' hardware wallet. And I see this viewpoint clearly, too.

So I suppose I'm saying that until the DIF becomes more professionalized and capitalized in years to come -- at which point, it should have employees who are incentivized enough and professional enough to store the funds themselves -- I see it this way:

If the staking rewards more or less pay for custodian fees, I'm fine for this to continue. But if the staking rewards are far outstripping the cost of storage, nodes should be taken down until the balance is restored.

I appreciate the wisdom of your post. Thanks Amanda!

Aside from the leeching issue, the DIF should NEVER do anything that interferes with the governance of the coin. Creating even a few masternodes can increase the number of votes proposals need to pass, and so this should be forbidden.

Thank you Amanda. I don't see a problem with the DIF holding assets that don't generate a return. The gold held by the DIF does not generate a return for example.

BTW, Has the DIF looked into lending Dash at interest on exchanges?

I am not sure about the lending thing exactly. In my view, all these unanswered questions are part of a greater issue, which I outlined in a public post recently. That issue is that there's no leadership at the DIF, and hence there can be no specific individuals held responsible for anything.

This is the reason I did not re-run for supervisor: the lack of hierarchical structure was enough to give me gray hair.

It's so simple. The DIF has an investment manager that handles day-to-day liquid investments. If the supervisors see an opportunity to make an illiquid investment, they create a pitch and present it to the DAO in a proposal. The DAO upvotes or downvotes it at this point.

The first group of supervisors seemed to be in a mad scramble to deploy whatever DIF funds they had by the end of their term, meeting multiple times a week and spending hours examining many proposals. Why the rush?

You have my support for this specific DIF 1st Tranche funding Q3-2020