Proposal “DIP-Pay-MNOs-Who-Vote“ (Closed)Back
| Title: | DIP: Pay MNOs Who Vote |
| Owner: | forro68 |
| One-time payment: | 1 DASH (36 USD) |
| Completed payments: | no payments occurred yet (1 month remaining) |
| Payment start/end: | 2024-09-08 / 2024-10-07 (added on 2024-08-28) |
| Final voting deadline: | in passed |
| Votes: | 38 Yes / 260 No / 66 Abstain |
Proposal description
Revised and resubmitted. If you support this proposal, vote yes and also remember to upvote it on the previous page. The haters downvote it, and we need to overcome that.
Many Masternode Owners don't take part in Dash governance. It takes time and effort to read all the proposals, ask questions, debate merits, and monitor results over time. Those who do should be directly rewarded for it.
At the end of each voting cycle, give all unspent funds to MNOs who voted either yes or no on a proposal, in proportion to how many proposals they have voted on. Abstains would not be included.
For example, at the end of a voting cycle, if there are 10 proposals, each with 500 'yes' or 'no' votes, that's 5000 votes total. If there are 1000 unspent dash at the end of the cycle, that's 0.2 dash per 'yes or no' vote. If an MNO voted 'yes/no' on one proposal, they would receive 0.2 dash. If an MNO voted 'yes/no' on 10 proposals, they would get 2 dash.
Logical Effects:
1. Increased Masternode return on investment: The small but important monthly 'bonus' will increase the ROI of having a masternode, making it a more attractive investment, so more people will invest in MNs, locking up more coins, increasing scarcity, and further raising the value of dash for all holders.
2. Increased quality of proposals: As all unspent funds would go to the voters, they will begin to require better proposals, more transparency, accountability, and better results. Proposal owners who cannot provide that will not be funded and those funds would instead go to the voters, increasing ROI.
3. Increased Governance participation: If we pay them to vote on proposals, more MNOs will come to vote, and they will see the proposals, ask questions, and begin to engage more with the community. They will bring fresh perspectives, new ideas, and share Dash news with the rest of the world.
4. Restored value of Dash: Over time, as proposals become more effective, the value of dash will rise, and that 2 dash will be worth much more, benefitting the MNOs and all holders. Dash has fallen from the top 10 to 160, and as far as 200. The Dash/BTC ratio has fallen from as high as 0.1 down to 0.0004!
5. There will likely be an increase in 'no' votes. However, we don't need to fear a wave of 'no' votes killing all proposals every month. MNOs are heavily invested in Dash. Currently a masternode costs ~$26,000. Ten MNs cost ~$260,000. One hundred MNs cost ~$2.600,000. These are not small investments. It is quite safe to assume the vast majority of MNOs want their holdings to increase in value. They understand we must fund developers, marketing and other things in order for the value of dash to rise. Very few would risk voting no on every proposal every month in hopes of gaining a couple extra dash as they know it risks destroying the value of their entire investment.
6. Reduced selling pressure: Every month, nearly a full 20% of Dash's block rewards are dumped on the market via proposal owners, many of whom do little to increase Dash's value. Having some of that remain with the MNOs who vote will reduce that selling pressure.
7. Reduced corruption: Many Proposal Owners have been paid repeatedly, month after month, for years, by a small group of loyal MNOs, While providing little to no results. There is likely some level of corruption between them, likely kickbacks. Bringing more voters to Dash will dilute the power of those few voters, and will eventually reduce that corruption if it's there.
Incentivizing MNOs to play a more active role will increase participation and breathe new life into the treasury, benefiting the entire community and all holders. It will become exciting again!
Keep in mind that some, but not all, of those who benefit from the current system, those who are getting easy money every month, will attack this idea with FUD. They don't care about dash, they just want their easy money. We can make this project better, let's do this.
See this great example of an MNO who did not vote nor participate, but would if they were directly incentivized:
https://www.dash.org/forum/index.php?threads/what-happened-to-masternode-rewards.55226/
This will work, folks!
Many Masternode Owners don't take part in Dash governance. It takes time and effort to read all the proposals, ask questions, debate merits, and monitor results over time. Those who do should be directly rewarded for it.
At the end of each voting cycle, give all unspent funds to MNOs who voted either yes or no on a proposal, in proportion to how many proposals they have voted on. Abstains would not be included.
For example, at the end of a voting cycle, if there are 10 proposals, each with 500 'yes' or 'no' votes, that's 5000 votes total. If there are 1000 unspent dash at the end of the cycle, that's 0.2 dash per 'yes or no' vote. If an MNO voted 'yes/no' on one proposal, they would receive 0.2 dash. If an MNO voted 'yes/no' on 10 proposals, they would get 2 dash.
Logical Effects:
1. Increased Masternode return on investment: The small but important monthly 'bonus' will increase the ROI of having a masternode, making it a more attractive investment, so more people will invest in MNs, locking up more coins, increasing scarcity, and further raising the value of dash for all holders.
2. Increased quality of proposals: As all unspent funds would go to the voters, they will begin to require better proposals, more transparency, accountability, and better results. Proposal owners who cannot provide that will not be funded and those funds would instead go to the voters, increasing ROI.
3. Increased Governance participation: If we pay them to vote on proposals, more MNOs will come to vote, and they will see the proposals, ask questions, and begin to engage more with the community. They will bring fresh perspectives, new ideas, and share Dash news with the rest of the world.
4. Restored value of Dash: Over time, as proposals become more effective, the value of dash will rise, and that 2 dash will be worth much more, benefitting the MNOs and all holders. Dash has fallen from the top 10 to 160, and as far as 200. The Dash/BTC ratio has fallen from as high as 0.1 down to 0.0004!
5. There will likely be an increase in 'no' votes. However, we don't need to fear a wave of 'no' votes killing all proposals every month. MNOs are heavily invested in Dash. Currently a masternode costs ~$26,000. Ten MNs cost ~$260,000. One hundred MNs cost ~$2.600,000. These are not small investments. It is quite safe to assume the vast majority of MNOs want their holdings to increase in value. They understand we must fund developers, marketing and other things in order for the value of dash to rise. Very few would risk voting no on every proposal every month in hopes of gaining a couple extra dash as they know it risks destroying the value of their entire investment.
6. Reduced selling pressure: Every month, nearly a full 20% of Dash's block rewards are dumped on the market via proposal owners, many of whom do little to increase Dash's value. Having some of that remain with the MNOs who vote will reduce that selling pressure.
7. Reduced corruption: Many Proposal Owners have been paid repeatedly, month after month, for years, by a small group of loyal MNOs, While providing little to no results. There is likely some level of corruption between them, likely kickbacks. Bringing more voters to Dash will dilute the power of those few voters, and will eventually reduce that corruption if it's there.
Incentivizing MNOs to play a more active role will increase participation and breathe new life into the treasury, benefiting the entire community and all holders. It will become exciting again!
Keep in mind that some, but not all, of those who benefit from the current system, those who are getting easy money every month, will attack this idea with FUD. They don't care about dash, they just want their easy money. We can make this project better, let's do this.
See this great example of an MNO who did not vote nor participate, but would if they were directly incentivized:
https://www.dash.org/forum/index.php?threads/what-happened-to-masternode-rewards.55226/
This will work, folks!
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Discussion: Should we fund this proposal?
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With gatekeepers who are willing to censor and supress differing opinions? Cryptocurrency was invented to fight this very thing!!
There is a real battle going on here where the insiders are trying to protect their power against those of us who want to bring more MNOs into the community.
See how by voting against my proposal you are voting to keep the insiders in power and preventing Dash from being the popular powerhouse crypto and community it could be!
The smallest of changes are difficult to get through and it doesn't help that this proposal is fundamentally broken i.e. not resistant to bots.
"Voting NO on this fucking spam! For goodness sake !!!"
Not the first time you did that.
Personally, I would like to see an end to all "decision proposals", I just want the treasury to pay for results, or at least incubate profitability and independence of the treasury. I wonder if all treasury payments should be loans, with cashback for results.
https://www.reddit.com/r/dashpay/comments/1fec0hc/if_you_have_a_dash_masternode_or_evonode_get_paid/
And here:
https://www.dash.org/forum/index.php?threads/shadowbanned-on-dashpay-reddit.55283/post-239474
Dash is all about aligning incentives, and this is a big improvement to the DAO.